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The objective of this thesis was to examine the development of and interface between 
naïve psychology and naïve biology. The main body of this thesis is composed of two 
articles submitted for publication. In the first paper, infants completed a generalized 
imitation task at 16 or 20 months of age which assessed their ability to generalize target 
properties to animate and inanimate beings. These infants returned to the laboratory at 
five years of age and were administered a battery of five ToM tasks an animacy-
acceptability task and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III. In the second experiment, 
infants participated in another generalized imitation task at 16 or 20 months of age which 
assessed their ability to generalize psychological properties to the appropriate animate 
domain. At six years of age, these children were administered a ToM battery, a task 
designed to measure the understanding of the essential properties of living and non-living 
kinds and the PPVT-III. Taken together, the results of these two longitudinal studies 
indicate continuity between the early understanding of the Animate-Inanimate (A-I) 
distinction and later knowledge of Theory of Mind at preschool age. In addition, infants’ 
ability to form an A-I distinction was linked to a more advanced understanding of 
animacy at preschool age, supporting the proposal that the A-I distinction in infancy 
might be a potential precursor to later naïve biology.  
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In the second paper, the focus was on young autistic’s children’s ability to form 
an A-I distinction. A sequential touching task was administered to a group of typically 
developing 18-month-old infants and to a group of young autistic children. The typically 
developing children successfully categorized at the domain level (e.g., animates vs. 
inanimate objects). In contrast, the children with ASD successfully categorized at the 
global (e.g. animals and vehicles) but not at the domain level. Importantly, these results 
indicate that typically developing infants can form categories at a higher level of 
inclusiveness than has previously been demonstrated. As well, the findings suggest that 
autistic children do indeed possess a concept of animacy, although the breadth of this 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
General Introduction  
Research on how children come to understand their mental world and that of 
others, has been performed under the rubric of ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM), ‘naïve 
psychology’, or more broadly ‘folk psychology’. More specifically, ToM has come to 
refer to the developmental understanding of mental states such as beliefs, intentions, 
desires, and emotions and to the ability to then reflect upon and reason about these mental 
states in oneself and others. The notion of a ToM presents a framework to study 
children’s conceptual knowledge from a social cognitive perspective and has become an 
increasingly prevalent focus of empirical research in developmental psychology over the 
last two decades.  
A number of theories have been proposed as explanations for children’s 
understanding of the mental world. The modularity account of ToM focuses on early 
competence with its premise being that children’s theory of the mental world has a 
specific, innate basis (Leslie, 1987). Researchers who endorse the modularity account 
posit that ToM is best conceptualized as a cognitive module that exists as a distinct 
ability that is independent and functionally separate from other cognitive skills (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Scholl & Leslie, 1999; 2001). Research on autism, a neurological disorder 
characterized by social-communicative difficulties, has strengthened the notion of ToM 
as a separate and domain specific ability. More specifically, impairment in ToM has been 
used to explain the core social and communicative deficits specific to Autism. Evidence 
of a deficient ToM relative to other cognitive functions, as is the case in autism and 
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Asperger’s syndrome, supports the modular view of ToM as a specialized cognitive skill 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Further, the modularity 
account of children’s understanding of the mind considers maturation as the mechanism 
that explains the development of ToM. In contrast to the modularity account of ToM, the 
‘theory theory’ perspective focuses on conceptual change (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Theory theory conceptualizes ToM as a gradually developing 
and evolving conceptual theory that is largely influenced by the child’s experiences. 
Theory theory does not view ToM as an innate ability nor as a specific cognitive module, 
but rather as a specialized skill reliant upon more general cognitive processes involved in 
knowledge formation (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). As a result, 
ToM is thought to develop gradually, as a series of stages which culminate in a mature 
ToM.  
The theory theory model of ToM has important implications for the origins of 
naïve psychology during the early developmental years (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & 
Chow, 2009). More specifically, the notion of ToM as gradually developing through a 
series of steps lends itself to an analysis of how each step may influence and contribute to 
the next one. Because one of the objectives of the first paper in the present thesis is to 
examine whether continuity exists between infants’ rudimentary understanding of the 
human mind and the more developed form of ToM abilities seen at later ages, a brief 
review of the empirical evidence that supports the notion of ToM as a gradually 
developing understanding of the mind is presented.  
The first to have introduced the term “Theory of Mind” were Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) who explored whether non-human primates possess a ToM. In the thirty 
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years since Premack and Woodfruff’s groundbreaking paper, a plethora of studies has 
been conducted examining how and when children come to experience mental states such 
as desires, perceptions, emotions, and beliefs. The general consensus of these empirical 
investigations is that important changes take place in children’s understanding of the 
mind between the ages of three and five, with a significant milestone being the 
understanding of false-belief at around age five.  
During these early developmental years, children gradually move from having 
acquired basic visual perspective-taking skills by two years of age in which they 
understand that the same object can be viewed differently by different people (i.e. they 
appreciate that another person may not see what they see and vice versa) (Flavell, 1992), 
to a more complex visual perspective-taking ability at around three years of age in which 
they understand that one’s visual perspective of an object influences how the object 
appears (i.e. the same object can result in different visual perceptions for people 
depending on the position from which it is viewed) (Flavell, 2000). At around this time, 
two-year-old children also begin to consider the desires of another person and can reason 
about others’ desires when interpreting behaviors. For instance, two-year-old children can 
correctly predict a person’s actions by taking into account his or her desires (Wellman & 
Wooley, 1990). By three years of age desires become associated with emotions and 
children understand that desires, perceptions, and emotions are interconnected (Wellman, 
Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000). Children at this age also begin to use belief terms, such as 
“want” and “like” and consider beliefs to be mental representations, though have yet to 
form a causal connection between beliefs and actions (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2009). 
However, at four years of age, a belief-desire theory is well established whereby children 
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understand that beliefs and desires interact with each other to generate intentions, and 
these intentions can guide behavior (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman, 1990).  
 These accomplishments culminate in the ability to distinguish true and false 
beliefs, as evidenced by the ability to pass false-belief tasks. In the classic version of the 
false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), a child witnesses a first character leave a 
room after having placed a ball in a specific location (e.g. a basket). As the first character 
remains outside the room, the child witnesses a second character move the ball to another 
location (e.g. a box). The first character is then made to re-enter the room, whereupon the 
child being tested is asked where this character will look for the ball. To answer 
correctly, children must understand that the character has a mistaken belief (one that is 
different from reality and from their own knowledge) of where the ball is and answer that 
the character will look in the basket even though the ball is really in the box. Research 
has demonstrated that normally developing four- to five-year-old children succeed on 
variations of this task, providing remarkable evidence of understanding representational 
mental states (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
 The various developmental stages that result in a full-fledged ToM at five to six 
years of age are thought to develop sequentially and to build upon each other in a 
cumulative fashion such that each earlier skill is a developmental prerequisite for a 
subsequent, more complex ability (Wellman & Liu, 2004), and to be “driven by the 
accumulation of data and information through experience” (Poulin-Dubois et al., p.61). In 
summary, there is mounting evidence that during these formative early years, children 
begin to attribute psychological states such as desire, perception, and emotion to people, 
at least at an implicit level (Meltzoff et al., 1999).  
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Because the theory-theory account focuses on conceptual changes and posits that 
an emerging ToM involves important changes (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), it lends itself 
to empirical investigations on the nature and origins of such changes. Indeed, researchers 
in the field of naïve psychology have attempted to explore the links between children’s 
early abilities and their later, more developed understanding of psychological states as 
described above. One of the initial manifestations of ToM might be evident in infants’ 
early awareness of other people. From a very young age, this awareness is identifiable in 
infants’ tendency to recognize diverse facial expressions and make use of this 
information to regulate behavior. For instance, 12 month-old infants have been found to 
act positively versus hesitantly toward objects depending on the emotion displayed by 
another person (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). As well, electrophysiological 
research has demonstrated that infants as young as seven months readily discriminate 
angry from fearful facial expressions (Kobiella, Grossmann, Reid, & Striano, 2008).  
The ability to follow eye gaze and subsequently detect a person’s goal is also 
instrumental in the development of a ToM. Indeed, research has shown that nine to 14 
month-old infants begin to successfully follow another person’s gaze (Butterworth, 1991) 
and become upset when people do not behave actively and contingently (Muir & Haines, 
1993). Further, in a recent study examining whether infants understand that a person’s 
action goals are influenced by perception, Luo and Johnson (2009) found that six month-
old infants did indeed consider what a person could see when interpreting the person’s 
actions toward an object, such as reaching or grasping the object. In light of such 
findings, the ability to follow eye gaze has been proposed as a necessary antecedent to 
engaging in joint-attention, a skill considered to be a precursor to ToM.  
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Since infants’ early ability to imitate other people’s behavior has significant 
implications for the development of social cognition (Meltzoff, 2007), the early 
manifestation of imitation has been put forward in the literature as another potential 
building block for the development of a ToM. Early research demonstrated that two- to 
three-week-old newborns are capable of consistently imitating facial (tongue protrusions) 
as well as manual (finger movement) gestures performed by another person (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1977). These results were replicated in a subsequent study whereby six-week-old 
infants reliably imitated facial gestures 24 hours after having seen an adult perform those 
gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1994). According to Meltzoff (2007), infant imitation 
entails observing another’s actions and construing those actions as corresponding to their 
own behaviors, thereby making a connection between their own states and those of 
others. In light of this model, imitation of other people’s actions and behaviors could be 
viewed as a significant stepping-stone towards the development of a mature ToM.  
Taken together, the research to date on infants has provided evidence for the 
manifestation of a number of behaviors such as joint visual attention, social referencing, 
and imitation suggestive of an emerging understanding of others as intentional agents 
(Poulin-Dubois, 1999). This research on how children begin to conceive others as 
purposeful, intentional agents has prompted an increased interest in the developmental 
precursors to such achievements during the first two years of life. As such, the search for 
antecedents and precursors of ToM with the use of longitudinal designs has significantly 
contributed to our understanding of the developmental progression in children’s 
understanding of mental states from infancy to preschool age. Indeed, a number of 
significant abilities, such as joint attention (Tomasello, 1995), understanding the 
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intentions of others (Meltzoff, 1995), pretence (Leslie, 1987, 1994), and imitation 
(Rogers & Pennington, 1991), have been proposed as putative precursors to the 
development of a full-fledge ToM.  
While there is relatively less empirical research in favor of these proposed 
precursors of a ToM, a number of longitudinal investigations have been conducted 
examining children’s early experiences and knowledge and their subsequent 
understanding of mental states (e.g. Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasselo, 1998; Charman et 
al., 2000; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005, 2007; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). For 
instance, Yamaguchi, Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & vanMarle (2009) examined whether there 
exists developmental continuity between performance on a social cognitive task which 
assessed infants’ understanding of goal-directed actions and ToM knowledge at preschool 
age. The authors found that while performance on a non-social cognitive task did not 
predict later ToM performance, performance on the social task in infancy, specifically the 
ability to comprehend goal-directed behavior at 12 months of age, did indeed predict 
ToM performance at four years of age. In a related study, Aschersleben, Hofer, and 
Jovanovic (2008) found that the ability to interpret actions as goal-directed at six months 
of age was linked to the later ability to attribute mental states, as measured by the ability 
to pass a false belief task at four years of age. These results were consisted with those of 
Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, and Hamilton (2008) as well as Olineck and Poulin-
Dubois (2005, 2007) who also found a longitudinal association between attention to 
intentional action in infancy and later development of ToM. In summary, evidence from 
these longitudinal studies does seem to support the view that continuity exists between 
observing and interpreting others’ behavior as intentional and goal-directed in infancy 
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and later social understanding at preschool age. Several other longitudinal studies 
performed over the last number of years have also found that additional infant abilities 
such as pretense (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) and joint attention (Charman et al., 2000) 
are critical precursors to the development of theory of mind.  
Overall, these findings are promising and point to early infancy as an important 
developmental period for ToM. Nonetheless, large gaps remain in our knowledge of the 
initial steps of naïve psychology. Future research is needed to further support the 
evidence presented thus far for the hypothesis that the origins of ToM knowledge lie in 
specific early infant abilities. Namely, studies are needed that expand upon the question 
of precursors of ToM in infancy by examining additional infant abilities that could be 
potential early indicators of later ToM. As such, the primary goal of the first paper in this 
thesis was to further examine the continuity hypothesis in a more systematic manner 
through a series of two longitudinal experiments carried out from infancy to the 
preschool period by examining whether infant’s biological understanding of the 
differences between animate and inanimate beings might be linked to later ToM 
knowledge.  
Children’s Knowledge of Naïve Biology  
Over the last two decades, a great deal of attention has been devoted to children’s 
early cognitive development and their increasing understanding of their surrounding 
world. Particular attention has been paid to children’s knowledge in core domains of 
thought, such as naïve psychology (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 
1998), naïve physics (e.g. Carey, 1985; Carey and Spelke, 1994), and naïve biology (e.g. 
Hatano and Inagaki, 1994). The research reviewed thus far on children’s naïve 
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psychology and their understanding of the mental world raises intriguing questions about 
children’s related knowledge of naïve biology and their understanding of biological 
phenomena. As such, the first paper of this dissertation sought to explore the extent of 
children’s understanding across both naïve psychology and naïve biology. More 
specifically, the question of whether the understanding of mental states such as desires, 
intentions, and beliefs during preschool years draws upon an earlier understanding of the 
biological differences between animates and inanimates was explored.  
Children’s knowledge of naïve biology has raised considerable research attention 
(Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). In particular, research in the field has focused on 
preschoolers understanding of biological phenomena such as the concepts of inheritance, 
internal bodily processes, illness and contamination, and knowledge of the differences 
between living and nonliving things. What follows is a brief review of this body of work 
to date.  
Children’s reasoning about inheritance has become a major focus in the scientific 
search for the origins and developmental progression of the understanding of naïve 
biology in childhood (Williams & Smith, 2006). One of the first studies examining 
children’s understanding of biological inheritance was conducted by Gelman and 
Wellman (1991). In this study, four-year-old children were told of a situation in which a 
baby animal was separated at birth from its family and subsequently raised by a different 
species. For instance, children were shown a picture of a baby cow and were informed 
that the baby cow was raised exclusively by pigs, at which point they were presented with 
a picture of pigs on a pig farm. The children were then asked a series of questions 
regarding the target animal’s (i.e. the cow) characteristics once it grew up. The questions 
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were designed to assess children’s understanding of the target animal’s category 
membership based on non-observable attributes, such as, in the cases of the cow for 
example, its future tail shape (straight versus curly) and the sound it would emit (‘oink’ 
versus ‘moo’). Results showed that preschool age children answered that a cow reared 
among pigs will have a straight tail when it grows up and will say ‘moo’, indicative of 
knowledge of category membership based on innate potential such as inheritance. A 
number of studies have added credence to Gelman and Wellman’s (1991) findings by 
establishing that preschool age children do indeed expect offspring to bear a resemblance 
to their birth parents and to share certain biological properties with them (Hirschfeld, 
1995; Springer, 1992, 1995). While such studies do indeed support the idea that children 
have an understanding of biological inheritance and possess a rudimentary grasp of the 
mechanisms of inheritance (Springer & Keil, 1991), other research has presented 
conflicting findings on the extent of preschooler’s understanding of biological inheritance 
(e.g. Solomon et al., 1996). Instead, it has been argued that children’s knowledge of 
certain factual information related to biological inheritance does not signify the existence 
of a domain-specific theory of biology (Solomon, 1998; 2002). Notwithstanding this line 
of reasoning, it is clear from the literature that young children do indeed have a biological 
understanding of inheritance to some extent.  
Children’s understanding of biology includes knowledge of processes other than 
inheritance, such as that of illness and contamination. In assessing children’s 
comprehension of the concept of illness, researchers have mainly looked at preschooler’s 
understanding of germs and whether they recognize that certain illnesses can be 
genetically transmitted (Raman & Gelman, 2005). Springer and Ruckel (1992), for 
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instance, showed that four- to five-year-old children think of illness as a result of coming 
into contact with contaminants such as germs, and not as a consequence of misbehaving.  
Additional support for children’s biological understanding of illness was provided 
by Kalish (1996) who found that four-to-five year old children consider the presence of 
germs to be a determining factor in whether contamination will lead to the onset of 
illness. More recently, Raman and Gelman (2005) found that by the time children reach 
preschool age, their understanding of illness becomes more sophisticated. More 
specifically, the authors found that preschoolers had an understanding that genetic 
disorders are transmitted differently (i.e. though a hereditary predisposition) than are 
contagious illnesses. While research to date suggests that preschoolers have amassed key 
biological information about health and illness, the extent to which this information is 
linked to causal mechanism of transmission and subsequently integrated into a biological 
‘theory’ is less clear (Au & Romo, 1999; Solomon & Cassamatis, 1999).  
Children’s ability to distinguish between living and non-living things is also an 
important part of their overall theory of biology. According to Inagaki and Hatano 
(2002), children as young as five years of age are capable of distinguishing living from 
non-living things, including animals and plants. Furthermore, by preschool age, children 
have formed an understanding that the capacity for goal-directed movement is an 
essential determinant for the concept of living things (Opfer & Siegler, 2004). For 
instance, Opfer (2001) found that by five years of age, children attributed life status to 
unfamiliar entities only when these were made to move on their own in a goal-directed 
manner and not when they appeared to move in an autonomous but aimless manner.  
12 
 
Thus far, the picture of children’s understanding of biological phenomena is an 
interesting, yet incomplete, one. There does appear to be substantial evidence to suggest 
that preschoolers have a basic level understanding of the biological world. What remains 
unknown however is the extent to which younger children have an initial understanding 
of the natural world that is indicative of their later, fuller awareness of naïve biology. 
Indeed, the research to date has focused virtually exclusively on preschoolers’ 
understanding of the biological world, with little information on the roots of this 
knowledge in infancy. Surely, if preschoolers can reason about concepts such as 
inheritance and illness, then such thought processes about important aspects of naïve 
biology might also be evident in early childhood. And yet, unlike the field of naïve 
psychology which has noticeably explored the roots of mental understanding in infancy, 
the field of naïve biology has failed to provide any comparative knowledge on the origins 
of naïve biology.  
Perhaps the only infant ability that has been proposed as a precursor for later 
knowledge of biology is the detection of animacy cues. Research demonstrating that 
infants are capable of discriminating animate (e.g. animals) from inanimate objects (e.g., 
vehicles) has been obtained with a wide range of experimental paradigms. In one of these 
tasks, a selection of objects from two contrasting categories is placed simultaneously 
before the infant and the sequence in which the infant touches the objects is observed. 
Infants’ understanding of distinctions between the two categories is established when 
objects that belong to the same category are sequentially touched more frequently than 
would be expected by chance. Using this object examination task, researchers have found 
that by 18-20 months of age, infants can distinguish between the animal and vehicle 
13 
 
domains, even when vastly dissimilar exemplars belonging to each category are presented 
(Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 1991). Comparable findings have been reported with 
infants as young as nine to 14 months (Mandler & McDonough,1993; Rakison & 
Butterworth, 1998a, 1998b). Additional research has also demonstrated that by 24-
months of age infants can distinguish animals from other artefacts as well, such as plants, 
furniture, and kitchen utensils (Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 1991). Using a diversity 
of experimental techniques appropriate for pre-verbal infants, researchers have also 
demonstrated that infants are capable of distinguishing people from inanimate objects 
(e.g., Ross, 1980). Spelke, Phillips, and Woodward (1995), for instance, found that 
seven-month-old infants reasoned differently about people and objects as evidence by 
their understanding that objects, but not people, require contact to move on their own. 
Taken together, these results suggest that infants have an understanding of people as 
different from objects.  
The ability to form an Animate-Inanimate (A-I) distinction, to distinguish 
between living and non-living things, extends beyond simply differentiating animate 
from inanimate objects, but also entails knowledge of biological properties such as 
motion. A recent notion that has greatly influenced the field of developmental research 
proposes that infants distinguish between animates and inanimates on the basis of the 
motion and mental characteristics of the members of these two categories (Rakison & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Studies that have examined the use motion cues as a basis for 
determining animacy have demonstrated that by the end of the first year of life, infants 
understand that inanimate objects are incapable of moving independently (e.g. Poulin-
Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland, 1996; Poulin-Dubois & Shultz, 1988; Phillips & Woodward, 
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1995). Spelke, Phillips, and Woodward (1995), for instance, found that seven month-old 
infants reacted differently upon seeing inanimate objects versus people change their 
motion with or without contact. That is, infants appeared to understand that only people, 
and not inanimate objects, have the ability to engage in self-propelled movement. 
Similarly findings were obtained by Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, and Ferland (1996) who 
examined nine- and 12- month-old infants’ reactions when presented with an unfamiliar 
inanimate object (a remote-controlled robot) and an unfamiliar animate object (a human 
stranger) which started to move on their own (i.e., without any outside causal force).   
Interestingly, infants as young as nine months of age showed an increase in 
negative affect (e.g., fussing/fretting, crying, clinging to mother) when they witnessed the 
inanimate object (robot) moving independently. The authors interpreted this finding as 
evidence that infants as young as nine months understand that inanimate objects are not 
self-propelled, providing further support for the notion that young infants discriminate 
between animate and inanimate objects on the basis of motion cues.   
Additional research has extended these findings by establishing that between nine 
and 14 months of age, infants are also capable of appropriately generalizing motion 
properties to superordinate-level categories of animals and vehicles (e.g. Mandler & 
McDonough, 1996; Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, & Johnson, 2006). As 
such, the current dissertation not only sought to explore whether the early ability to 
generalize motion and psychological properties to animate and inanimate beings is a 
precursor for the later knowledge of ToM, but also whether there exists developmental 
continuity between the early understanding of essential properties of living and non-
living kinds, such as motion cues, in infancy and a later more developed form of naïve 
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biology. The first set of studies reported here are the first of their kind to examine such 
longitudinal associations.   
The Early Detection of Autism  
In the second paper of this dissertation, the interface between naïve psychology 
and naïve biology was explored in a population of autistic children. Autism is a lifelong 
neurodevelopmental syndrome characterized by a triad of symptoms: (a) impairment in 
social interactions, (b) verbal and non-verbal communicative difficulties, and (c) 
restrictive and stereotypical patterns of behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). According to the most recent definition in the DSM-IV, the social limitations are 
typified by an impaired use of non-verbal behaviours to regulate social interaction (e.g. 
eye contact, facial expression, gestures), a failure to develop age-appropriate peer 
relationships, and a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment or interests with 
others. An absence of social or emotional reciprocity may also be evident. The range of 
symptoms indicative of communicative dysfunction include a delay or nonexistence of 
spoken language, a restricted ability to initiate or sustain conversations, stereotyped or 
repetitive use of language, and difficulties in social imitation or pretend play. Patterns of 
behaviour are usually characterized by an encompassing preoccupation with stereotyped 
and restricted interest that is abnormal in intensity or focus, a strict adherence to specific 
non-functional routines, stereotyped motor movements, and an insistent preoccupation 
with parts of objects. A delay in social development, language, or in symbolic 
/imaginative play before the age of three must also be present before a diagnosis of 
autism can be made. In addition, a specified number of symptoms are required from each 
category and must have an onset before the age of three.   
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A great deal of progress has been made over the last twenty years in bringing 
attention to and promoting awareness of autism. In large part due to a dramatic increase 
in autism-related research, some of the mystery surrounding this disorder has been 
resolved. In particular, current conceptualizations of the neuropsychological impairments 
in autism, such as a deficient ToM, have greatly contributed to our understanding of the 
disorder. Despite the progress made however, much remains unknown about the 
developmental progression of the disorder in infancy. In particular, despite clear 
manifestation of autism-related deficits by 36 months of age, earlier signs of the disorder 
are not easily identifiable. As such, it is imperative that tasks be developed that allow for 
the early identification and intervention of very young children with autism, especially in 
light of research indicating that autistic symptoms may be recognizable early on (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Lord, 1995).  
The benefits of early intervention are unquestionable and underscore the need for 
effective early identification. Parental reports of atypical development during infancy, 
coupled with the fact that children are seldom diagnosed before 36 months (despite an 
onset prior to 36 months being a necessary criterion for diagnosis), has prompted a 
pressing need amongst researchers and practitioners alike for means of accurately 
detecting autism at a younger age. As such, increasing research is devoted to exploring 
symptoms of autism that may exist in very young children that would then allow for early 
identification during routine visits to the child’s primary healthcare practitioner. Indeed, 
recent research suggests that it is possible to recognize symptoms of autism and 
accurately diagnose autism in toddlers and preschool age children. For example, Lord 
(1995) found that 88% of children diagnosed with autism at two years of age retained 
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their diagnosis of autism at age three when re-evaluated by a separate, independent 
clinician. The author also found that an overall clinical judgment of autism at age two 
was more stable over time than was a diagnosis based on standardized measures of 
diagnostic criteria obtained at the same age. In a separate study, Stone et al. (1999) 
examined the diagnostic stability of an autism diagnosis in a sample of 37 children who 
received an autism spectrum diagnosis at 24 months during an initial evaluation and who 
returned one year later for a second evaluation conducted by a different clinician. The 
clinicians were instructed to make diagnoses based on clinical judgments, information 
available from parental and teacher reports, home and school observation data, and 
cognitive and developmental test results. The authors found that autism was more stable a 
diagnosis at two years of age compared to the diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) at the same age. Moreover, when 
examined one year later, 96% of children originally diagnosed with autism remained on 
the autism spectrum, while 72% actually retained the specific diagnosis of autism. These 
findings are consistent with other studies that have found that autism can be diagnosed 
accurately in children as young as 20 months (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Cox et al., 
1999). Although it is generally agreed that autism can be diagnosed prior to the DSM’s 
specification of 36 months, and while the urgency of early identification is well-
acknowledged in the literature, it is not uncommon for health care professionals to show 
reluctance in diagnosing autism in very young children (despite evidence of early signs of 
the disorder, Filipek et al., 1999). Whether due to an initial fear of mislabelling the child 
or causing undue stress to families, this hesitation to diagnose young children is 
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significantly compounded by the fact that clinicians have available to them few 
instruments which have been developed specifically to detect autism in young children.  
In an attempt to detect the behavioural signs and symptoms of autism at an early 
age, researchers have comprehensively examined the ToM deficit hypothesis of autism. 
In 1985, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith hypothesized that people with autism are 
specifically impaired in this capacity to reflect upon other people’s mental states and that 
such an impairment can therefore account for their limitations in the realm of social 
understanding, pretend play, and communication that are considered core features of the 
disorder. Accordingly, the ToM deficit hypothesis then, posits that “a fault in just one of 
the many components of the social brain can lead to an inability to understand certain 
basic aspects of communication” (Hill & Frith, 2004, pg.5). The notion that a ToM deficit 
is at the root of autism has been advanced by a number of researchers and substantiated 
by a cornucopia of experimental studies. Following Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) 
suggestion that children with autism have an impairment in meta-representation, that is, 
in their capacity to represent and predict other’s states of mind, a wealth of tests have 
been developed to explore how the ToM deficit manifests itself in autistic individuals. 
The most commonly employed ToM test being the false-belief task. Normally developing 
three- to four-year-old children, as well as children with mild degrees of mental 
retardation and language impaired children reliably succeed on variations of this task, 
providing remarkable evidence of understanding representational mental states – of 
possessing a ToM. In stark contrast, autistic children have been shown to consistently fail 
false-belief tasks, despite having a higher mental age than their comparison groups (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Frith, Leslie, Leekman, 1989).  
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Variations of the false-belief task have been administered to groups of autistic 
subjects with differing IQs, chronological ages, and mental ages and have all yielded a 
similar pattern of results (see Happé, 1995 for a review). False-belief tasks, however, are 
not the only tests of ToM on which autistic children have been shown to be impaired. 
Seeking to better understand autistic children’s concept of belief, Sodian & Frith (1992) 
tested autistic children’s ability to manipulate other’s beliefs through deception. The 
authors found that autistic children with a mental age (MA) of four were significantly 
impaired in their ability to deceive compared to normally developing and mentally 
retarded children of a similar MA.  
The issue of joint attention is also one that has been extensively researched, with 
consistent findings indicating that autistic children show marked deficits in this area (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson, 1997; Carpenter, Pennington, and 
Rogers, 2002). These findings of impaired ability to use eye gaze for non-verbal 
communication are supported by a plethora of studies showing that autistic children have 
difficulties in sharing attention, detecting gaze direction, and orienting to stimuli relative 
to children with Down syndrome and normally developing children (e.g. Dawson, 
Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990). Other 
ToM tasks that show delays in autistic children include those that assess pretend play and 
imitative abilities. Consistently, children with autism have been shown to have marked 
deficits in their production of spontaneous pretend or symbolic play when compared to 
controls matched on CA or MA (Beeghly, 1998; Lewis & Boucher, 1988). With regards 
to imitation performance, which has been suggested as a critical component in the 
development of a ToM, the research is less conclusive concerning autistic children’s 
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capabilities. A large body of research does however indicate that older children with 
autism consistently have imitative limitations, suggesting that an early deficit in imitation 
does exist (Hobson & Lee, 1999; Smith & Bryson, 1994).   
Autistic Children’s Understanding of Animacy  
The preponderance of research put forth by the ToM account of autism supports 
the idea that autistic individuals have striking and specific ToM deficits. The link 
between that of naïve psychology and naïve biology can be further explored by 
examining whether, in addition to a ToM deficit, autistic children also demonstrate a 
deficit in naïve biology. This is of particular interest in light a recent proposal that the 
perception of social information might be related to the processing of biological motion 
(Castelli, Frith, Happé & Frith, 2002). Rutherford, Pennington, and Rogers (2006) have 
even argued that the ability to perceive social information is contingent upon the 
detection of motion properties. This contention has been substantiated by a plethora of 
studies demonstrating that typically developing children and adults alike can accurately 
distinguish biological from mechanical motion (Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; 
Heider & Simmel, 1944; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000). In the case of autism, it has been 
suggested that autistic individuals may demonstrate specific deficits in processing 
perceptual causality or biological motion, which could be linked to ToM deficits (Ray & 
Schlottmann, 2006).  
The possibility that children with autism do not perceive biological motion in the 
same way as typically developing children has significant clinical implications, notably 
for the early detection of autism. Rutherford, Pennington, and Rogers (2006) suggested 
that the ability to form an animate-inanimate (A-I) distinction is a precursor for later 
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social understanding in typical development. If this is indeed the case, the authors also 
reasoned that the social deficits typical of autism could potentially be linked to an early 
inability to use motion properties to form an A-I distinction. It stands to reason then that 
the A-I distinction be another potential precursor for ToM. Furthermore, it is possible that 
a deficit in the detection of biological motion in autism could be discernable in terms of 
difficulties to form global categories of animate and inanimate objects. As such, the 
inability to form an A-I distinction could also be an early marker to detect autism-related 
deficits.  
The goal of the second paper of this dissertation therefore was to examine young 
autistic children’s ability to form a global A-I distinction. No study has, as of yet, 
explored whether typically developing nor atypically developing children can form 
categories at a higher level of inclusiveness than animals, people, vehicles, and furniture. 
A categorization task was therefore administered to a group of typically developing 18-
month-old infants as well as to a group of young autistic children in order to evaluate 
their ability to form an animate-inanimate distinction at this domain level.  
Certainly, studies on typical child development often contribute to a better 
understanding of disorders such as autism. In relation to the current thesis, a better 
understanding of the development of the animacy concept in young typically developing 
and autistic children, and its link to the acquisition of a ToM can ultimately have a 
significant impact on the early detection of autism. There currently exists a shortage of 
screening tools that accurately detect autistic features in young infants, which leads to 
delays in diagnoses and ultimately poorer outcomes. The benefit derived from 
longitudinal studies is that the results can be used in the development of screening for 
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individuals at risk for autism. Further, earlier detection is often translated into earlier 
treatment opportunities. If specific aspects of the proposed putative precursor can be 
shown to relate to later ToM, these could provide target foci for intervention programmes 
for individual with autism.  
Overall, the current thesis attempts to fill a gap in our existing knowledge of 
precursors of ToM, advance our understanding about the continuity between these 
precursors and later ToM and biological knowledge, and potentially contribute to our 
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Contribution of Authors 
This section details the contributions of the first author in the article entitled 
“Chapter 2: Infants’ concept of animacy and later naïve biology and theory of mind: A 
longitudinal study.” The two experiments reported in this paper were both conducted in 
the Cognitive Development Laboratory in the Centre for Research in Human 
Development at Concordia University, Montreal. 
 The experimental methodology and research design for the two preschool studies 
in Experiment 1 and 2 were designed collaboratively by the first and second authors. The 
first author created the stimuli used in Theory of Mind battery, devised the administration 
protocols, orders (i.e., counterbalancing), and coding forms. The infancy study reported 
in Experiment 2 of this paper was part of the first author’s Masters Thesis which was also 
supervised by the second author and appears in Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, 
and Johnson (2006). 
 In preparation for testing, the first author composed recruitment letters, consent 
forms, and parent questionnaires that were used in each of the studies. Once recruitment 
letters were mailed, the first author contacted potential participating families by telephone 
to inquire about their interest in taking part in the studies. A total of 18 participants were 
tested in the first preschool study and 21 participants were tested in the second preschool 
study. All the children were tested by the first author who also explained the procedure to 
the parents, with the exception of a total of six children who were tested by a research 
assistant. In the latter case, the first author was either present during the testing but stood 
behind a one-way mirror or reviewed the video tapes of the testing session and coded the 
data. As well, the first author followed-up with the participating families by writing them 
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a letter thanking them for their participation and informing them of the general results of 
the studies. 
 With regards to coding and data analysis, the first author coded all of the 
children's responses by viewing taped recordings of the testing sessions. A research 
assistant re-coded the data for reliability purposes and a second assistant conducted inter-
rater reliability tests on the coding. The first author then inputted the data into an SPSS 
worksheet and conducted all subsequent analyses. The first author wrote the abstract, 
introduction, methods, results, and discussion sections of this paper. The second author 






Two experiments are reported on the relation between the concept of animacy in 
infancy and children’s naïve biology and psychology. In Experiment 1, infants who were 
administered a generalized imitation task at 16 or 20 months which assessed their ability 
to generalize target properties to the animate and inanimate domain were followed-up at 
five years of age and administered a battery of Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. In 
Experiment 2, infants who were administered a generalized imitation task at 16 or 20 
months which assessed their ability to generalize psychological properties to the 
appropriate animate category (e.g. people versus animals), were followed-up at six years 
of age and administered a ToM battery as well as a task designed to measure 
preschoolers’ understanding of the essential properties of living and non-living kinds. 
Overall, the results of this set of studies are suggestive of a developmental progression 
between the early understanding of the Animate-Inanimate (A-I) distinction and later 
knowledge of Theory of Mind such as false belief at the preschool age. As well, 
developmental continuity between the A-I distinction in infancy and a more advanced 
kind of naïve biology at preschool age was found, supporting Inagaki and Hatano’s 
(2002) proposal that the A-I distinction in infancy might be a potential precursor to later 





Infants’ Concept of Animacy and Later Naïve Biology and Theory of Mind: 
A Longitudinal Study.  
The ability to reflect on the content of one’s own and another’s mind is a 
significant cognitive achievement. This achievement, which has been coined ‘theory of 
mind’ (ToM) or ‘naïve psychology’, refers to the ability to infer the full range of mental 
states that cause action, including beliefs, desires, precepts, thoughts, and other inner 
experiences to ourselves as well as others (Premack, & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 1992). 
Indeed, without a ToM, social interaction would be virtually impossible.  
It is generally accepted that the litmus test for ToM development  is the ability to 
attribute false beliefs – to appreciate that others can possess beliefs about the world that 
are a misrepresentation of reality. This ability to know and understand others’ mental 
states, as reflected by children’s understand of false beliefs, has been found to develop at 
four to five years of age in normally developing children (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001).  
Over the past two decades, children’s developing ToM has been the topic of 
intense research. Much work has examined what children know about a variety of 
different mental states, the possible theories that can account for the developmental 
progression of children’s understanding of these mental states, as well as the 
consequences of children’s ToM on their social behavior (Flavell, 2004). Along these 
lines, particular interest has been paid to the question of when, and how, children form 




While the level of ToM development manifested by children’s performance on 
false belief tasks is evident at four or five years, younger children have also been found to 
demonstrate certain characteristics of an adult-like ToM (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004, Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000). For instance, by the age 
of three, children can consider the desires of another and subsequently provide 
psychological, mentalistic explanations for human behaviour (Colonnesi, Koops, & 
Meerum, 2008; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Furthermore, by the time children reach 
their second birthday, their ability to refer to internal states is already evident in their 
vocabulary, which includes desire terms such as ‘want’ (Wellman & Bartsch, 1994). 
Thus, it is evident that early on, children are readily engaging in desire-based reasoning 
when interpreting other people’s behaviors (Sodian, 2009; Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & 
Chow, 2009).  
Between 12 and 18 months, infants also demonstrate a number of behaviors that 
seemingly indicate a “beginning awareness of intentionality” (Flavell, 2004, p.280). In a 
recent study, 18-month-olds were able to consider the beliefs of an adult when helping 
the adult achieve a goal, suggesting an early understanding of other’s behavior as 
intentional and goal-directed (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Infants’ 
ability to interpret gestures such as pointing and looking at objects as goal-directed has 
also been demonstrated in several studies (e.g., Phillips, Wellman & Spelke, 2002; 
Sodian & Thoermer, 2004). As well, between 12 and 15 months, infants classified as high 
in their understanding of others’ intentions have been found to produce a greater 
proportion of declarative pointing gestures than infants with less understanding of other’s 
intentions (Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 2004). Taken together, 
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recent research seems to indicate that infants are proficient at reasoning reason about 
goals and intentions shortly after their first birthday.  
The predominant view that children’s ability to reason about beliefs, and in 
particular false beliefs, is not apparent until preschool age has been challenged by a 
number of recent studies demonstrating that even young infants have some understanding 
of false beliefs. Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007), for instance, conducted a study in 
which they replaced the classic false-belief test with a nonverbal version and measured 
25-month-old infants’ anticipatory looking with the use of an eyetracker. The infants 
were presented with movies depicting an actor seeing a toy being hidden. In the test trial, 
the children watched as the toy was removed from its original location and hidden in a 
new location, unbeknownst to the actor. Recordings of the infants’ anticipatory looking 
behaviour indicated that infants reliably anticipated where the actor would look for the 
toy based on the actor’s false belief of the toy’s hidden location. Additional studies have 
supplemented these findings and lent credence to the notion that infants between 13 and 
18 months are capable of considering another’s false beliefs when predicting that 
person’s behaviour (Buttelmann et. al., 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Song, Onishi, 
Baillargeon, and Fisher, 2008).  
Early manifestations of ToM is also evident in infants’ understanding that a 
person’s action goals are influenced by perception. For instance, Luo and Johnson (2009) 
found that six month-old infants considered what a person could see when interpreting 
the person’s actions toward an object, such as reaching or grasping the object. Using a 
diversity of experimental paradigms, researchers have found that by the time infants 
reach their first birthday, they have a rudimentary understanding of the link between a 
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person’s visual perception and their subsequent action goals (e.g. Chow, Poulin-Dubois, 
& Lewis, 2008; Dunphy-Lelii & Wellman, 2004). Taken together, the research to date 
seems to indicate that by the time children reach the end of their first year of life, they are 
already conceptualizing people as mental agents and are displaying behaviors suggestive 
of this budding understanding of others as intentional agents.  
The transition from an initial understanding of mental states during the infant and 
toddler years to a more encompassing, representational ToM at the preschool age has 
garnered growing interest in the field of cognitive developmental psychology. In fact, 
recent years have witnessed an upsurge of research on the origins of ToM development 
and numerous theorists have begun to consider putative precursors of ToM in infancy.  
Several accounts of ToM development posit that the emergence of joint attention 
(Tomasello, 1995), understanding the intentions of others (Meltzoff, 1995), pretence 
(Leslie, 1987, 1994), and imitation (Rogers & Pennington, 1991) abilities in infancy are 
linked to later ToM ability. Despite a profusion of literature suggesting that the 
aforementioned proficiencies during the first years of life constitute infant abilities that 
are developmental “precursors” to a ToM, much less direct empirical evidence has been 
provided to support these claims. Surprisingly, there is a relative dearth of longitudinal 
studies that have addressed the link between ToM precursors and children’s later ToM 
abilities.  
In 1993, Taylor, Cartwright, and Carlson reported that children who readily 
described the presence of an imaginary friend in their lives had an easier time becoming 
involved in fantasy and were more likely to engage in fantasy play of their own accord 
than did children who did not possess an imaginary friend. Such findings, along with the 
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earlier suggestion that knowledge of the difference between appearance and reality is a 
component of the broader ability to reflect upon the content of one’s own and another’s 
mind (Flavell, Green, and Flavell, 1986), prompted researchers to examine the possibility 
of a link between pretence and ToM development. Subsequently, Youngblade and Dunn 
(1995) conducted a longitudinal study in which they found that infants who engaged in 
more pretend play at 33 months performed better on false belief tasks and had a better 
understanding of other people’s beliefs and feelings at 40 months of age. The authors 
concluded that early social pretence denoted a developmental landmark in children’s later 
acquisition of ToM abilities, such as social understanding. Youngblade and Dunn’s 
research represented one of the first studies to establish continuity between infants’ 
social-cognitive abilities and later achievements in preschool by ascertaining the role of 
early pretense to the later development of ToM abilities.  
Joint attention has also been considered an essential element in the development 
of a ToM. Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasselo (1998) examined the emergence and 
developmental progression of five specific social-cognitive skills (including joint 
engagement, attention following and imitative learning) among 24 month-old infants over 
the course of six months. The authors found that the age range between nine and 12 
months represents a critical window for the development of social cognitive skills in 
infancy. In one of the first longitudinal studies to assess whether joint attention abilities 
in infancy predict ToM knowledge in childhood, Charman et al. (2000) collected 
measures of play, joint attention, and imitation abilities in 20-month-old infants followed 
by measures of ToM functioning at 44 months. While the authors found that joint 
attention behaviours (alternating between looking at an adult and an object & looking to 
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an adult in the course of an ambiguous goal detection task) predicted ToM ability at 44 
months, neither imitation nor play abilities were longitudinally associated with later ToM 
ability. Most recently, Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops, and Perucchini (2008) found that 
behaviors linked to joint attention (i.e. a soliciting pointing gesture) at 12 and 15 months 
was predictive of ToM performance at 39 months as measured by the use of 
psychological explanations for mental states.  
A number of other studies conducted over the past few years have proposed that 
the ability to interpret the intentional actions of others is a developmental precursor to the 
later development of a ToM. Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005, 2007), for instance, 
found continuity between intentional imitation at 14-18 months and internal state 
language at 32 months and intention understanding at four years, providing preliminarily 
evidence for the relationship between children’s early understanding of intentionality and 
later ToM knowledge. Likewise, Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, and LaLonde (2004) 
found that 14-month-olds infants’ habituation to human intentional action significantly 
predicted their later performance on ToM tasks at 51 months of age. Similar findings 
have been reported in other studies using the habituation task whereby a decrease in 
attention during the habituation task on human intentional action predicted performance 
on a battery of theory of mind tasks administered at four years of age (Aschersleben, 
Hofer, & Jovanovic, 2008; Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008; 
Yamaguchi, Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & vanMarle, 2009)  
The above studies have strengthened the notion that an important developmental 
relationship exists between particular socio-cognitive skills in infancy and later ToM 
ability. Although a definite consensus regarding the exact predictive function of these 
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developmental precursors has yet to be reached, what seems evident from the research is 
that these abilities might well be antecedents to a more advanced understanding of mental 
states. Nonetheless, there remain large gaps in our knowledge of the putative precursors 
of ToM in infancy. Certainly, more research is required to elucidate the roots of this 
naïve psychology during the infancy period.  
The Animate-Inanimate distinction as a potential precursor to later ToM  
Naïve psychology is but one aspect of children’s emerging understanding of the 
world that surrounds them. Another aspect includes children’s naïve biology – their 
classification and reasoning of biological phenomena. The ability to classify and reason 
about the natural world, which is often referred to as ‘folk biology’ or ‘naïve biology’, 
has become a prevalent theme in the study of children’s conceptual knowledge (Inagaki 
& Hatano, 2002, Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Indeed, children’s understanding of biology 
has been proposed as another basic conceptual domain to that of naïve psychology 
(Coley, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992), and a great deal of attention has focused on the 
nature of children’s conceptual knowledge of categories. One line of thought proposes 
that infants form broad categories of objects prior to developing more specific ones. For 
instance, infants would have formed a broad, domain-general category of animate beings 
(humans, animals), which incorporates a superordinate-level category of animals (dogs, 
cats, birds etc.), which itself includes a basic-level category of dogs. This lower-level 
category is referred to as a subordinate-level category, and in this instance would consist 
of different types of dogs (e.g., Poodle, Dalmatian, etc). It is widely accepted that infants 
possess some understanding of superordinate categories that surpasses knowledge of 
purely perceptual similarities.  
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The ability to categorize objects into animate and inanimate domains is 
considered a major milestone in cognitive development (Gelman & Opfer, 2002; Rakison 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Furthermore, research has established that by the time children 
reach five years of age, they have advanced beyond simply differentiating animate from 
inanimate domains to possessing a conceptual understanding of biological occurrences 
and are capable of making predictions and offering explanations for such phenomena 
(Inagaki & Hatano, 2006). For instance, Backscheider, Shatz, & Gelman (1993) found 
that four-year-old children are capable of differentiating plants and animals from non-
living things (e.g. artifacts) when it comes to the potential for regrowth. That is, the 
children in this study had an understanding that plants and animals could regrow when 
damaged whereas artifacts do not heal through regrowth but rather, need to be mended by 
humans.  
Children’s understanding of the biological distinctions between living (e.g. 
animals) and non-living kinds (e.g. artifacts) has been explored by a host of researchers 
examining a wide range of criteria for category inclusiveness. Along these lines, Simons 
and Keil (1995) reported that preschoolers understand that the insides of animals differ to 
those of machines. Similarly, in a series of experiments designed to examine whether 
children understand that animals (and not artifacts) grow in size over time, Rosengren, 
Gelman, Kalish, and McCormick (1991) presented children aged three to six years with a 
picture of a baby animal and one of a new artifact, followed by a picture of the same 
animal that had aged and one of the artifact looking more worn. The children were then 
asked to identify the animal as an adult, or the artifact that had been used for a long time. 
The authors found that children as young as three and four years of age comprehend that 
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animals, in contrast to inanimate objects, grow in size over time. More recently, Greif, 
Kemler-Nelson, Keil and Gutierrez (2006) further explored children’s understanding of 
the distinction between animals and artifacts by examining the questions that 32 
preschoolers posed relating to animals versus artifacts. The results showed that children’s 
line of questioning differed for animals than for artifacts. Specifically, children asked 
questions specific to the functions of artifacts whereas they were more likely to inquire 
about the biologically relevant characteristics of animals (e.g. eating habits, location). 
The authors argued that the children’s questions revealed a “deep-seated conceptual 
contrast between animals and artifacts” (p.458).  
There is also evidence that by preschool age children have acquired an 
overarching category of ‘living things’ that encompasses animals and plants as distinct 
from non-living things. According to Carey (1985), the conceptualization of a broad 
category of animates that encompasses animals and plants is critical to the formation of 
naïve biology. The extensive research of Inagaki and Hatano (2002) led the authors to 
argue that young children not only differentiate animals and plants from non-living 
things, but they also have a deeper understanding of characteristics shared by animals and 
plants and have thus formed a superordinate category of living things. For instance, the 
authors ascertained that five-year-old children recognize that both plants and animals 
have a mutual need for water and share characteristics such as growth (Inagaki & Hatano, 
2002). Although contradictory findings permeate the literature over children’s possession 
of the concept of  “alive”, Leddon, Waxman, and Medin (2007) found that when the word 
‘alive’ was substituted with the less ambiguous term ‘living thing’, children were more 
likely to attribute life status to plants as well as animals. Leddon and colleague thus 
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argued that children have formed a broad category of animates that includes plants and 
animals by age six to seven, thereby demonstrating an “early appreciation of a core 
biological concept that includes plants as well as animate entities” (p.470).  
Recent research have supplemented studies on children’s conceptualization of 
‘living things’ by providing information regarding the understanding of biological 
properties other than ‘alive’, such as motion. A leading notion in the field of 
developmental research is that infants distinguish between animates and inanimates on 
the basis of the motion and mental characteristics of the members of these two categories 
at around the middle of the second year of life (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Indeed, 
a multitude of studies have demonstrated that preschool aged children can correctly infer 
appropriate motion to animates (i.e. self-propelled, goal-directed) and inanimates (i.e. 
movement in response to impact or gravity) (Gelman, 1990; Opfer & Siegler, 2004).  
Even young children have an understanding of the animate-inanimate (A-I) 
distinction. More specifically, a number of studies have suggested that from an early age 
infants are sensitive to motion cues and that by the end of the first year they have 
acquired an understanding that inanimate objects are not capable of moving on their own 
(Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland, 1996; Poulin-Dubois & Shultz, 1988; Spelke, 
Phillips & Woodward, 1995). Beyond a basic understanding that animates and inanimates 
differ as a function of motion properties, it has been established that infants between nine 
and 14 months are also capable of correctly generalizing motion properties to 
superordinate-level categories of animals and vehicles (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 
1996; McDonough & Mandler, 1998; Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, & 
Johnson, 2006).  
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Research on the A-I distinction seems to indicate a change in the understanding of 
animate motion during the second year of life which translates into new ways of 
understanding and conceptualizing human behavior. The research reviewed thus far 
inspired us to examine how children’s naïve biology interfaces with naïve psychology. 
Little research has attempted to compare children’s understanding across both naïve 
psychology and naïve biology (Binnie & Williams, 2002). As well, what remains 
unknown is whether there exists a long-term developmental continuity in ToM 
development from infancy to childhood. Of particular interest is the link between how 
children distinguish the physical world from mental phenomena and their more advanced 
ToM knowledge at preschool age. A second line of interest is whether naïve biology has 
its roots in an earlier understanding of the differences between animates and inanimates. 
In light of these questions, the main goal of the present set of studies was to further 
examine longitudinal associations between potential precursor abilities in infancy and the 
more developed form of naïve psychology and biology in the preschool years.  
In two related experiments, we attempt to examine three questions. First, in light 
of an earlier proposal that the A-I distinction in infancy is a precursor to the 
living/nonliving distinction (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002), we were interested in examining 
whether continuity exists between the A-I distinction in infancy and the knowledge of the 
concept of ‘animacy’ at the preschool age. Second, taking into consideration Carey’s 
(1985) early assertion that the domain of naïve biology emerges from that of naïve 
psychology, we were interested in examining whether the understanding of mental states 
such as desires, intentions, beliefs during preschool years draws upon an earlier 
understanding of the biological differences between animates and inanimates. It is 
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important to note that recent arguments challenging Carey’s position assert that naïve 
biology is an independent knowledge system, (e.g. Inagaki & Hatano, 1993). Our primary 
aim is not to shed light on the debate per se, but to test the possibility that the 
accomplishment of an A-I distinction in infancy might be linked to later ToM ability. As 
such, we thought it important to investigate whether infants who are better able to 
distinguish between animate and inanimate properties will perform better on ToM tasks 
at preschool age. The proposed study is the first of its kind to examine this link. Lastly, 
we considered whether ToM abilities and knowledge of the concept of ‘animacy’ are 
concurrently related at the preschool age.  
In Experiment 1, infants who were administered a generalized imitation task at 16 
or 20 months which assessed their ability to generalize target properties to the animate 
(i.e. animals) vs. inanimate (i.e. vehicle) domain were invited to return to the laboratory 
at five years of age. During the second testing session, the children were administered a 
version of Tunmer’s (1985) animacy-acceptability task whereby they were presented with 
36 sentences and asked to judge whether each sentence was “okay” or “silly”. The task 
consisted of some sentences which were semantically anomalous ones violating the 
animate-inanimate distinction (e.g. “The pencil ate the piece of cake on the table”) and 
others which violated the sentient-nonsentient distinction (e.g. “The tree wants the 
babysitter to fix the toy”). To examine whether children’s knowledge of people and 
mental states is developmentally related to their prior knowledge of categories of living 
and non-living entities, a battery of four ToM tasks (Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 
2002) was also administered during the follow-up testing session at preschool. The 
battery included tasks that assess mental constructs such as desires, beliefs, and emotions 
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by telling children stories and asking them to guess what a character knows or prefers 
based on these stories. In Experiment 2, a sample of subjects who had participated in a 
slightly different generalized imitation task in infancy returned to the laboratory at 
preschool age and were administered the ToM battery as well as a different task to 
measure knowledge of the concept of ‘animacy’ at preschool age. The Animacy task in 
this second study was designed to assess children’s naïve thinking about the essential 
properties of living and non-living kinds (adapted from Inagaki and Sugiyama, 1988). 
Children were asked to attribute 12 animate properties to phylogenetically varied animate 
objects (e.g., person, rabbit) and inanimate objects (e.g., stone, tree). The 12 properties 
consisted of anatomical/biological properties (e.g. heart, bones, breath) and 
mental/psychological properties (e.g. feeling, wanting).  
Experiment 1  
              The goal of the current study was twofold: 1) to examine whether knowledge of 
the A-I distinction in infancy is linked to later ToM ability and to the knowledge of the 
concept of ‘animacy’ at the preschool age, and 2) to examine whether ToM abilities and 
knowledge of the concept of ‘animacy’ are concurrently related at the preschool age.  
Method 
Participants  
The 18 participants (10 boys and 8 girls; M = 63.93 months, SD = 1.75, range = 
60.92-65.95) included in the sample consisted of a group of preschoolers who had 
originally participated in a generalized imitation task during infancy (at 16 or 20 months) 
which assessed their ability to generalize target properties to the animate (i.e. animals) or 
inanimate (i.e. vehicle) domain. All infants had a minimum 35-week gestation period and 
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none had visual or auditory impairments, as reported by their parents. The participants 
were French- (N=5) or English-(N=13) speaking from predominantly middle-class 
families living in the greater Montréal area. Of the 18 participants, ten had participated in 
the infancy study at 16 months of age and eight had participated in the infancy study at 
20 months of age.  
The participants were initially recruited from an existing participant pool, 
available at the Cognitive Development Laboratory at the Centre for Research in Human 
Development (CRDH) at Concordia University, or through birth lists provided by the 
Régie Régionale de la Santé et des Services Sociaux de la Région de Montréal-Centre, 
with the approval of the Commission d’Accès à l’Information du Québec. For the follow-
up study at the preschool age, participants who were included in the final sample of the 
infancy study (N = 60) were re-contacted. The parents were first sent a letter describing 
the nature of the study and were then contacted by telephone to inquire about their 
interest in returning to our laboratory with their children. Of the 60 participants who were 
mailed recruitment letters, 34 were reached by phone. Among those, 18 agreed to 
participate and subsequently took part in the study.  As a result, the final sample of 
participants included in the follow-up study at preschool age represented 30% of 
participants who participated in the infancy study. A sample recruitment letter used in 
Experiment 1 is provided in Appendix A. 
Materials  
Infant Task  
The stimuli employed for the generalized imitation task consisted of a wall and a 
staircase built of Lego blocks, a small plastic telephone, and a circular mirror attached to 
a wooden base. Four small plastic replicas of animals (a tiger, a cow, a horse, and a pig) 
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and of vehicles (a truck, a tractor, a bus, and a motorcycle) were used as test exemplars. 
Small plastic replicas of people (e.g. man, woman, boy, girl) were used to model the four 
activities.  
Preschool Task  
The testing session included three tasks: A Theory of Mind (ToM) battery 
(Slaughter et al., 2002), an Animacy Acceptability task (adapted from Tunmer, 1985) and 
the English or French version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III (PPVT/EVIP) 
(Dunn & Dunn, 1997), a standardized measure of verbal intelligence. The ToM battery 
included five tasks that assess mental constructs such as desires, beliefs, and emotions by 
telling children stories and asking them to guess what a character knows or prefers based 
on these stories. The materials employed in the administration of the ToM battery 
included three plasticized photographs of 5-year-old boys and three of 5-year-old girls, a 
box of Smarties containing crayons, a plasticized picture of a carrot and a cookie, a 
plasticized picture of a Barbie doll and a racing car, four plasticized images with the 
schematic figure of a boy in the center and a different chocolate bar at each corner, and 
four plasticized images with the schematic figure of a girl in the center and a different 
chocolate bar at each corner. For the latter two sets of pictures, the images differed with 
respect to which chocolate bar the schematic figure’s eyes were directed at. An additional 
plasticized image of the different chocolate bars at each corner was also employed with 
no face in the center. All plasticized images measured 21.6 x 35.6 cm.  
The Animacy Acceptability Task consisted of 36 questions: four practice 
questions, 16 semantically acceptable questions, and 16 semantically anomalous 
questions. The sentences were generally of similar length and were generated using 
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words deemed to be familiar to children of preschool age. An equal number of acceptable 
and unacceptable sentences were included in order to control for a possible response bias 
effect. Further, the sentences were arranged in a quasi-random order such that no more 
than two sentences from any given category were presented consecutively. Consistent 
with Tunmer (1985), children were tested on two different types of animate properties 
(eat, sleep) and two different types of sentient properties (want, know). The 16 acceptable 
questions consisted of equal numbers of questions involving the animate-inanimate 
domain (e.g. “The father slept in the chair by the fireplace”) and the sentient-nonsentient 
domain (e.g., “The monkey wants to climb the trees in the zoo). Within each of these 
categories, half the questions consisted of a person as the agent and half in which the 
agent was a mammal. The 16 unacceptable sentences contained violations of selectional 
restrictions on verbs and were divided into two groups – those involving the animate-
inanimate selectional restriction (e.g. “The pencil ate the piece of cake on the table”) and 
those involving the sentient-nonsentient selectional restriction (e.g. “The tree wants the 
babysitter to fix the toy). Within the animate-inanimate category, the agent was always a 
different artifact (e.g., eraser, fridge). The questions within the sentient-nonsentient 
domain consisted of an equal number of sentences in which the agent was either a plant 
(e.g. tulip, tree) or an artifact.  
The materials employed to administer the PPVT (or the EVIP) a standardized test 
of receptive lexical knowledge, consisted of English and French versions of a hard cover 
test kit containing a series of 204 stimulus words and a response sheet. The 204 stimulus 
words were arranged in order of increasing difficulty and each word was depicted by one 
of four black and white line drawings arranged on a page called a PicturePlate. The 
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PicturePlate always consisted of four pictures: one picture which represented the item 
spoken by the experimenter and three distracter pictures.  
Procedure  
Infant Task  
A generalized imitation task was administered at 16 or 20 months of age. The task 
consisted a baseline phase and a generalization phase. Infants were tested on four 
activities: two motion activities (e.g., moving up stairs, jumping over a wall) and two 
sensory activities (looking, listening). Following a baseline phase during which time 
infants were allowed to explore the objects until they had touched all of them, infants 
observed the experimenter model two animate-like motions with a small plastic replica of 
a person (climbing up stairs, jumping over a block) and two sensory activities (looking 
into a mirror, listening on a phone). In the generalization phase, infants were given the 
prop (e.g., the stairs) along with an exemplar from the target domain (e.g., an animal) and 
an exemplar from the other domain (e.g., a vehicle) and had the opportunity to imitate the 
modelled actions. A different model exemplar (e.g., the man) was used to demonstrate 
each activity. The test exemplar pair consisted of one vehicle and one animal. The 
baseline-modelling-generalization sequence was repeated until all four activities were 
administered. The four activities were presented in a counterbalanced fashion such that 
each activity was administered equally often as the first, second, third, or fourth trial, 
with the exception that no two sensory or motion activities preceded each other. The 
choice of test exemplars for each activity was also counterbalanced across participants to 
ensure that each exemplar was presented equally often with each prop, as well as with the 
test exemplars from the contrasting category. Full details of the experimental measures 
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and procedure of the infancy study are provided in Poulin-Dubois et al. (2006), 
experiment 2.  
Preschool Task  
              The preschoolers and their parent(s) were greeted in a reception room arranged 
as a playroom. During a brief warm-up period, the experimenter played with the child to 
enable him/her to become accustomed to both the new environment and the 
experimenter. During this time, the parent was asked to sign a consent form and to 
complete a participant questionnaire. The participant questionnaire requested 
demographic, familial, and medical information and also served as a screening tool to 
exclude participants who had physical conditions either before or after birth (i.e., born 
prematurely, vision/hearing problems). Once the child seemed at ease (usually after 10-
15 minutes), the parents and their child were accompanied to the testing room and the 
parent was invited to observe the session through a one-way mirror. The child was 
instructed to sit in a child-sized yellow chair at a round table in the center of the testing 
room. The experimenter sat in a small blue chair across from the participant. All testing 
sessions were recorded . See Appendix B for sample consent forms used in Experiment 1 
and 2 of this paper and Appendix C for a sample participant questionnaire. 
Each testing session consisted of three tasks which were administered in a 
counterbalanced order across all participants such that each task appeared equally often in 
first, second, or third place. The ToM battery (Slaughter et al., 2002) was composed of 
five tasks: two standard unexpected contents false belief tasks (Gopnik & Astington, 
1988), a conflicting emotion task, a conflicting desire task, and a version of the Four 
Sweets task (Baron-Cohen, 1994). Within the ToM battery, the administration of the 
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tasks was counterbalanced across participants using a partial Latin square. The sole 
constraint imposed on the counterbalancing procedure was that the two false-belief tasks 
were always administered consecutively as they were both relevant to the same story and 
relied on the same materials. According to Slaughter et al., each of the five tasks is 
designed to assess children’s ability to identify two different mental-state perspectives on 
the same situations. Each task consisted of a short story involving a story character of the 
same age as the participant. The story character’s gender was always matched with the 
gender of the participant. The pictures of story characters differed for each task in order 
to allow children to differentiate between the various stories. A sample protocol for the 
ToM battery is provided in Appendix D.  
The Animacy Acceptability task was presented in the form of a game in which the 
experimenter held a male or female puppet (matched for the child’s gender). The child 
was told that the puppet would produce some sentences and that the child was to judge 
whether each sentence was ‘okay’ or ‘silly’. Four practice questions were first 
administered to the child and corrective feedback was provided in the case of an incorrect 
response. All four practice questions were semantically anomalous sentences which 
contained violations that differed from the test questions (e.g. “The ballerina drank the 
dream”). Following the practice questions, the experimenter administered all 36 test 
sentences. No feedback was provided for the test questions. However, for sentences on 
which the children answered ‘silly’, they were asked to provide explanations for their 
responses (e.g., “Why is it silly?”) up to a maximum of eight questions. A sample 
protocol for the animacy-acceptability task is provided in Appendix E.  
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Children were also administered the PPVT. Since language ability has been found 
to be a strong predictor of ToM performance both concurrently (Jenkins & Astington, 
1996), and longitudinally (Astington & Jenkins, 1999), it seemed important to obtain an 
indicator of preschool verbal ability. The PPVT is a standard measure of receptive 
vocabulary which has been employed in a number of studies examining the relationship 
between children’s language ability and tasks measuring social competence (e.g., 
Longoria, Page, Hubbs-Tait, & Kennison, 2009; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2007). 
Including the PPVT in the battery of tasks therefore allowed for the assessment of, and 
control for, preschool verbal IQ. The PPVT was administered by showing the child a set 
of four pictures and asking the child to point to the picture that best represents the word 
given by the experimenter. Given that the testing time for this task can be quite lengthy 
depending on the child’s vocabulary level, the child was offered a small gift (stickers) 
intermittently in order to encourage him/her to continue. Upon completion of the study, a 
small toy and a certificate of merit for contribution to science was given to the children 
for their participation.   
Coding and Scoring  
Infant Task  
              Infants’ responses were coded for performance of the target actions with the 
animal and vehicle test exemplars in the baseline and generalization phases. A response 
was deemed successful when infants performed an explicit imitation of the modelled 
activity. The dependent variable was the first object chosen to enact an activity 
(maximum score = 4). If a participant used both test exemplars to imitate an activity, the 
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first exemplar chosen was considered. For full details of the scoring criteria, please refer 
to Poulin-Dubois et al. (2006), experiment 2.  
Preschool Task  
Children’s responses on the ToM battery were scored on a pass/fail basis. In order 
to successfully pass any given task, correct responses were required on all control and 
test questions. A total ToM score was obtained by summing children’s pass/fail scores on 
the individual ToM tasks (e.g., Self belief, Other belief, Emotion, Desire, Four Sweets), 
with scores ranging from zero to five. According to Slaughter et al.’s coding procedure, a 
total ToM score was computed to reveal the general, multifaceted understanding of 
mental states that children possess. See Appendix F for a sample coding form for the 
ToM battery. 
Children’s responses on the Animacy Acceptability task were coded as correct or 
incorrect. A total score was computed by summing children’s correct responses on the 32 
test questions. As well, a difference score was computed by subtracting the number of 
correct responses on the unacceptable animate-inanimate questions from the number of 
correct responses on the unacceptable sentient-nonsentient questions, with scores ranging 
from negative eight to plus eight. Because Tunmer’s (1985) results revealed a 
developmental progression in children’s understanding of animate versus sentient 
properties, with the acquisition of the sentient-nonsentient distinction occurring later in 
development than the animate-inanimate distinction, it was posited that a difference score 
would be a stricter measure of children’s understanding of animacy at preschool age. 
Higher scores on this difference score measure were taken as an indication of a more 
48 
 
developed understanding of the concept of animacy. See Appendix G for a sample coding 
form for the animacy-acceptability task. 
Inter-coder Agreement  
Infant Task  
              The data set was coded by the primary researcher. 20% of the infants were coded 
a second time by a second, independent, researcher. A percentage agreement was 
calculated between the two coders’ ratings of infants’ first-choice responses which served 
as a measure of intercoder reliability. The average intercoder reliability for the 16-month-
old age group was assessed at 94% and 98% for the 20-month-old age group.                
Preschool Task  
              The primary researcher coded all the data. Twenty percent of the data set was 
further coded by a second, independent coder. Average percentage of intercoder 
agreement for the ToM battery was 100%. For the Animacy Acceptability task, 
percentage of intercoder agreement on the total amount of correct responses was also 
100%.  
Results and Discussion 
              Results for the individual tasks are presented first. The results are then divided 
into three parts, two of which examine longitudinal links between infant measures of 
categorization ability and preschool measures of ToM and animacy. A third set of results 
examines the concurrent link between ToM and animacy knowledge at preschool age.  
Infant Task  
A score of one was assigned for each successfully imitated target activity whereas 
a score of zero indicated that no activity was imitated. As such, the maximum possible 
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score obtainable on motion trials was two, and likewise on the sensory trials. Group 
patterns were examined by means of a repeated measures ANOVA with activity (motion, 
sensory), trial (baseline, generalization), and exemplar (vehicle, animal) as the within-
subjects factors. The between-subjects factor was age (16 months, 20 months). The 
dependent measure consisted of the frequency of target events performed.  
The results showed a main effect of trial with infants performing significantly 
more target actions from baseline (M = 10%) to generalization (M = 41%), F (1, 58) = 
91.16, p < .001. An interaction between trial and age was also found, F (1, 58) = 6.66, p 
=.01, n
2
p = .11. Follow-up comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments revealed that the 
20-month-old group performed significantly more target activities (M = 50%) than the 
16-month-old group (M = 32%, p <.01) at generalization, though not at baseline (20 
months M = 11%, 16 months M = 10%). Infants also enacted more target activities with 
the animal (M = 37%) than the vehicle (M = 15%), as evidence by a significant main 
effect of exemplar, F (1, 58) = 16.94, p < .001, n
2
p =.23. Furthermore, a trial by exemplar 
interaction indicated that infants chose the animal (M = 61%) more often than the vehicle 
(M = 22%) to perform the target activities during the generalization but not the baseline 
(animal: M = 13%, vehicle: M = 8%) phase, F (1, 58) = 16.04, p < .001. As well, an 
interaction between exemplar and activity indicated that infants chose the animal equally 
often to enact the motion (M = 35%) and sensory (M = 38%) activities, but preferred the 
vehicle to perform the motion (M = 21%) over the sensory (M = 9%) activities, F (1, 58) 
= 4.20, p = .04, as illustrated in Figure 1. Lastly, a main effect of age revealed that 20-
month-old infants performed significantly more target activities (M = 30%) than the 16-




Figure 1. Percentage of sensory and motion events performed (+SE) with the animal and 
vehicle exemplars during the baseline and generalization phase of the infant imitation 














































Preschool Task  
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 3rd edition (PPVT/EVIP-III) 
 Children’s language proficiency was assessed by the PPVT/EVIP-III.  Three 
children did not complete the PPVT.  Among the English-speaking children, there was no 
significant difference in male (M = 108.75, SD = 16.48) versus female children’s (M = 
117.67, SD = 13.32) performance on the PPVT, t(9) = .83, p = .63, d = -.60. French-
speaking male (M = 108.00) and female (M = 117.00, SD = 20.52) children also 
performed similarly on the PPVT, t(2) = .38, p = .74. As an overall group, there was no 
significant difference in French-speaking (M = 114.75, SD = 17.35) and English-speaking 
(M=111.18, SD = 15.59) children’s performance on the PPVT, t(13) = .38, p = .71, d = 
.22. As a result, English- and French-speaking children were combined in subsequent 
analyses.  
Theory of Mind and Animacy measures at 64 months  
Children’s total ToM scores, which were computed by adding together the scores 
on the Self Belief, Other Belief, Emotion, Desire and Four Sweets tasks, ranged from 0 to 
5 (M = 3.06, SD = 1.66), indicating their understanding of mental states. Children’s 
performance on our ToM battery was somewhat higher than that of Slaughter et al.’s 
(2002) 65-month-old participants who had a mean score of 2.81 (SD = 1.13) on their 
ToM scale. We conducted a reliability analysis on children’s performance of the five 
tasks, which revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of .71. On this measure, our finding was 
comparable to Slaughter et. al’s reliability value of .51, indicating reasonable internal 
reliability on a scale of five items.  
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Children’s performance on the Animacy-Acceptability task was coded for correct 
judgments on each set of 16 a) acceptable psychological (M = 6.44, SD = 1.63), b) 
acceptable biological (M = 5.13, SD = 1.78), c) unacceptable psychological (M = 7.13, 
SD = 1.31), and d) unacceptable biological sentences (M = 6.63, SD = 1.54). Children’s 
performance on this task was compared to that of Tunmer’s (1985) sample of five-year-
old participants. Since mean values were not published in Tunmer’s article, we present 
approximate values derived from Tunmer’s graph (p. 995): a) acceptable psychological 
(Tunmer = 83%, Current study = 40%), b) acceptable biological (Tunmer = 83%, Current 
study = 32%), c) unacceptable psychological (Tunmer = 71%, Current study = 45%), and 
d) unacceptable biological sentences (Tunmer = 94%, Current study = 41%). The data 
suggest that the sample of children in this study did not perform as well on our Animacy 
task as those in Tunmer’s study. It may be that the adapted version of Tunmer’s task 
employed in this study did not tap into children’s understanding of animacy as well as the 
original version, thereby accounting for the overall lower performance on our task. 
Another possibility may be that the children were simply focusing on an unusual string of 
words in the sentences – a grammatical anomaly - rather than focusing on the semantic 
anomaly of the sentences. This seems unlikely however in light of the fact that some 
variability nonetheless exists across performance on the different categories of questions 
in our study. Moreover, the difference in performance on the unacceptable psychological 
sentences (71%) versus the unacceptable biological sentences (94%) in Tunmer’s study 
seems to indicate that children are not simply focusing on the grammatical anomalies of 
the sentences but rather, are indeed being attentive to the acceptability of the sentences. 
Furthermore, consistent with Tunmer’s sample of five-year-old participants, it seems that 
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performance on our Animacy task was also relatively consistent across the different 
categories of questions. Table 1 shows the mean scores on the ToM and Animacy 
preschool measures administered in Experiment 1.  
Longitudinal Analyses 
 
The relationship between the understanding of the A-I distinction in infancy and ToM at 
preschool age  
 The small number of participants who returned at Time 2 to participate in the 
preschool study prevented us from considering the two age groups in the induction study 
separately when reporting the results of the longitudinal analyses. Since examining the 
difference in performance between the 16- and 20-month old infants at Time 2 was not 
possible, we therefore report here only the results of the induction study collapsed over 
age.  
The objective of the first set of analyses was to determine whether the ability to 
categorize objects into animate and inanimate domains, an ability that develops during 
the second year of life, is a predictor of ToM ability at preschool age. This was done by 
generating a correlation between the total amount of times (maximum score out of four) 
infants chose the animal over the vehicle at 16 or 20 months during the generalization 
trial and ToM ability at 64 months, as measured by a total ToM score (maximum score 
out of five). Children’s performance on the infancy task, as measured by a total score, did 
not predict ToM ability at preschool age, r(18)=.31, p=.21.  
A second analysis was conducted to further examine this longitudinal 





Scores for all experimental variables administered to preschoolers in Experiment 1  
 N Mean SD 
False Belief (out of 2) 18 1.39 .85 
Emotion 18 .61 .50 
Desires 18 .39 .50 
Four Sweets 18 .67 .49 
Total ToM Score 18 3.06 1.66 
Total Acceptable Psychological 16  6.44 1.63 
Total Acceptable Biological 16  5.13 1.78 
Total Unacceptable Psychological  16 7.13 1.31 





subtracting the number of times the infant chose the animal to model the target activity at 
baseline from the number of times the infant chose the animal to do so at generalization.  
It is important to recall that infants were presented with both an animal and a vehicle 
exemplar at generalization. A higher differencescore would therefore indicate that infants 
chose the animals more often than the vehicles at generalization (while taking into 
account their baseline performance), suggesting that they correctly understood that 
animals were more appropriate than vehicles to perform the target activities. To examine 
whether performance on the infancy task using this difference score predicted 
performance on the preschool ToM task, a Pearson correlation was conducted between 
the difference score on the induction task and the total ToM score. No statistical 
significant correlation was found r(18)=.12, p=.65. Infants’ performance on the induction 
task, as measured by both the total score (r(11)=.02, p=.95) and the difference score 
(r(11)=-.08, p=.79) measures also failed to correlate with ToM ability at preschool age 
when the PPVT was partialed out (3 children could not be included in these latter 
analyses due to an inability to complete the PPVT).  
Seeing as false belief understanding has traditionally been viewed as the 
cornerstone of ToM development (e.g. Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983), an analysis examining the relationship between performance on the 
infancy task and false belief understanding at preschool age was conducted. Success on 
the false-belief task was defined conservatively as a perfect score out of two. A point-
biserial correlation between the total score on the infancy task and scores on the false 
belief task reached marginal significance rpb(18)=.41, p=.09, though the relationship 
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between the difference score on the infancy task and knowledge of false belief did not 
reach significance rpb(18)=.32, p=.19.  
A final analysis was conducted to explore whether children who passed the false-
belief task had a better understanding of the animate-inanimate distinction at infancy than 
those who failed the false-belief task. Children who passed the false-belief task (N=61%) 
tended to choose the animal over the vehicle at generalization more often than those who 
failed the false-belief task (N=39%), although this just reached marginal statistical 
significance t(16)=1.81, p =.09.  
The relationship between the understanding of the A-I distinction in infancy and 
knowledge of animacy at preschool age  
In the second set of analyses, the goal was to examine whether there exists a 
longitudinal relationship between knowledge of the animate-inanimate distinction at 16 
or 20 months and a more developed understanding of animacy at 64 months. Infants’ 
performance on the inductive generalization task, as measured both by a total score and 
by a difference score, failed to correlate with performance on the animacy acceptability 
task, as measured by children’s total number of correct responses out of 32 (total score: 
r(16)=.22, p=.41; difference score: r(16)=.16, p=.56). Infants’ performance on the 
induction task, as measured by both the total score (r(11)=.11, p=.71 ) and the difference 
score (r(11)=.22, p=.47) measures also failed to correlate with animacy knowledge at 
preschool age when the PPVT was partialed out (5 children could not be included in 
these latter analyses due to an inability to complete the AA task and/or the PPVT).  
Infant’s performance on the induction task was also correlated with performance 
on the animacy-acceptability task as measured by a difference in the number of correct 
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responses on the unacceptable animate-inanimate questions and the number of correct 
responses on the unacceptable sentient-nonsentient questions. Using the difference score 
on the infancy task as a measure of infant’s understanding of the animate-inanimate 
distinction did not produce any significant findings, r(16)=.31, p=.24. However, using a 
total score (the total amount of times out of four that infants chose the animal over the 
vehicle during the generalization trial) on the infancy task to generate the correlation 
indicated that infants’ choice of the animal at generalization strongly predicted 
performance on the animacy acceptability task as measured by the difference score, 
r(16)=.55, p=.03. It was then examined whether the significant correlation could be 
accounted for by a more general association between knowledge of animacy and later 
verbal language. The relationship remained when PPVT scores were partialed out, 
although this missed significance r(11)=.50, p=.09.  
Concurrent Analyses 
The concurrent relationship between ToM and concept of animacy at preschool age  
In the third set of analyses, we examined whether ToM ability and knowledge of 
animacy are concurrently related at the preschool age. There was a significant correlation 
between children’s performance on the AA task, as measured by a total score, and their 
performance on the ToM task, r(16)=.59, p=.02, though this did not remain significant 
once the PPVT was partialed out, r(11)=.28, p=.36. Using a difference score on the AA 
task as indicative of animacy knowledge revealed a trend for the two measures to be 
related, r(16)=.47, p=.07, though this trend did not remain once the PPVT was partialled 
out r(11)=.13, p=68. The Pearson correlations computed between all dependent variables 
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in Experiment 1 and the partial correlations which factored out verbal language ability, 





Intercorrelations between children's performance on the infant generalized imitation task 
and performance on preschool theory of mind and animacy tasks in Experiment 1. Partial 
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Experiment 2  
The current study aimed to replicate Experiment 1 using a sample of subjects who 
had participated in a slightly different generalized imitation task in infancy. As well, in 
light of Inagaki and Hatano’s (1992) assertion that the understanding of the distinction 
between living and non-living things is essential to the later development of biological 
knowledge, we employed a different task to measure knowledge of the concept of 
‘animacy’ at preschool age, adapted from Inagaki and Sugiyama (1988). Of particular 
interest was the question of whether children’s ability to generalize motion and 
psychological properties in infancy might predict their later ability to attribute 
physiological and psychological properties at preschool age. The ToM task of 
Experiment 1 and the PPVT were also administered. The Animacy task in the current 
study was designed to assess children’s naïve thinking about the essential properties of 
living and non-living kinds. The goal of the current study was twofold: 1) to examine 
whether the ability to generalize motion and sensory activities across a broad animate 
domain in infancy is linked to later ToM ability and to children’s naïve thinking about the 
essential properties of living and non-living kinds at the preschool age, and 2) to examine 
whether ToM abilities and children’s naïve thinking of concepts of living kinds are 
concurrently related at the preschool age.  
Method  
Participants  
The 21 participants (12 boys and 9 girls; M = 72.07 months, SD = .97, range = 
70.72-74.30) included in the sample consisted of a group of preschoolers who had 
originally participated in a generalized imitation task during infancy (at 16 or 20 months) 
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which assessed their ability to generalize motion (e.g. moving up stairs) and sensory (e.g. 
looking in a mirror) properties to animals and people. The inclusion criteria consisted of a 
minimum 35-week gestation period and no visual or auditory impairments. The 
participants were French- (N=6) or English-(N=15) speaking from predominantly middle-
class families living in the greater Montréal area. Of the 21 participants, nine had 
participated in the infancy study at 16 months of age and 12 had participated in the 
infancy study at 20 months of age. 
The recruitment of participants in this study was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
For the follow-up study at the preschool age, participants who were included in the final 
sample of the infancy study (N = 48) were re-contacted. As in Experiment 1, the parents 
were first sent a letter describing the nature of the study and were then contacted by 
telephone to inquire about their interest in returning to our laboratory with their children. 
Of the 48 participants who were mailed recruitment letters, 21 were reached by phone 
and agreed to participate. As a result, the final sample of participants included in the 
follow-up study at preschool age represented 44% of participants who participated in the 
infancy study. A sample recruitment letter for Experiment 2 is provided in Appendix H. 
Materials  
Infant Task   
              The materials and procedure of the infancy study were identical to the infancy 
study of Experiment 1, with the exception being that a monkey doll was used as the 
model exemplar and miniature replicas of people and animals served as test exemplars.  
Preschool Task  
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As in Experiment 1, the testing session included three tasks: A Theory of Mind 
(ToM) battery (Slaughter et al., 2002), an Animacy task (adapted from Inagaki and 
Sugiyama, 1988) and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) or EVIP test. The 
materials and the administration of the ToM battery and the PPVT were identical to that 
of Experiment 1.  
The Animacy task was specifically designed to measure preschoolers’ naïve 
understanding of the distinction between psychological and biological properties. The 
task consisted of 12 questions pertaining to each of eight phylogenetically different 
objects (person, rabbit, pigeon, fish, grasshopper, tulip, tree, stone) making a total of 96 
questions asked. The 12 properties assessed consisted of four unobservable 
anatomical/biological properties (heart, bones, breath, growth), five unobservable 
mental/psychological properties (thinking, feeling happiness, feeling pain (sensation), 
wanting, knowing), and three observable properties (eyes, movement, speech). All 12 
properties were asked about a specific target object (e.g. the person) before the 
experimenter proceeded to another object. The specific order in which the properties 
were assessed was fixed within each of the set of 12 questions and adhered to the 
following order: eye, bones, breath, growth, sensation, movement, thinking, wanting, 
knowing, feeling, speaking, and heart. However, the order in which the eight target 
objects were administered was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Procedure  
Infant Task  
The administration of the generalized imitation task was identical to that of 
Experiment 1, with the exception of the model and test exemplars. Full details of the 
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experimental measures and procedure of the infancy study are provided in Experiment 3 
of Poulin-Dubois et al. (2006).  
Preschool Task  
The procedure and design were the same as in Experiment 1, as was the 
counterbalanced order in which the tasks were administered. Each testing session 
therefore consisted of three tasks: The ToM battery, Animacy task, and the PPVT/EVIP. 
The Animacy task was presented in the form of a game whereby the experimenter asked 
the child questions and the child was required to answer yes or no to those questions (e.g. 
“Does a tulip have a heart?”). No feedback was provided for the questions. Given the 
length of the task, children were given stickers randomly throughout the task in order to 
motivate them.  
Coding and Scoring  
Infant Task  
As in Experiment 1, infants’ responses were coded for performance of the target 
actions with the animal and person test exemplars for the baseline and generalization 
phases.  
Preschool Task  
Children’s responses on the ToM battery and the PPVT were scored according to 
the protocol outlined in Experiment 1. Children’s responses on the Animacy task were 
coded as correct or incorrect. Percentages of over-attribution and under-attribution errors 
were calculated out of the total responses of the objects having the property, or those not 
having it. The over-attribution errors for the anatomical/physiological properties were 
made my attributing: bones, breath, growth and heart to the stone; bones to the 
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grasshopper; bones and heart to plants. The over-attribution errors for the 
mental/psychological properties were made my attributing: thinking and feeling pain to 
the fish, grasshopper, plants, and the stone; feeling happy to all the objects apart from the 
person; wanting and knowing to the fish, grasshopper, plants, and the stone. The over-
attribution errors for the observable properties were made my attributing: eyes and 
movement to the stone and plants; speech to all the objects except for a person. The 
under-attribution errors for the anatomical, mental, and observable properties consisted 
of ‘NO’ responses to the remaining objects. A sample administration and coding protocol 
for the Animacy task is provided in Appendix I. 
Inter-coder Agreement  
Infant Task  
              The data from the infancy study was coded by the primary researcher. A subset 
of infants (20%) was coded by a second, independent, researcher. A percentage 
agreement was calculated between the two coders’ ratings of infants’ first-choice 
responses which served as a measure of intercoder reliability. The average intercoder 
reliability for both the 16- and 20-month-old age groups was assessed at 96%.  
Preschool Task  
The primary researcher coded all the data. Twenty percent of the data set was 
further coded by a second, independent coder. Percentage of intercoder agreement for the 
both the ToM battery and the Animacy task was 100%.  
Results and Discussion  
Results for the individual tasks are presented first. The results are then divided 
into three parts, two of which examine longitudinal links between infant measures of 
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categorization ability and preschool measures of ToM and knowledge of essential 
properties of living and non-living kinds. A third set of results examines the concurrent 
link between ToM and knowledge of essential properties of living and non-living kinds at 
the preschool age.  
Infant Task  
Consistent with Experiment 1, infants received a score of 1 for each target activity 
that was successfully imitated, and a score of 0 if no activity was imitated. A repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted with activity (motion, sensory), trial (baseline, 
generalization), and exemplar (person, animal) as the within-subjects factors. Age (16 
months, 20 months) served as the between-subject factor. The frequency of target events 
performed served as the dependent measure.  
A main effect of trial indicated that infants performed more target activities 
during the generalization (M = 57%) than during the baseline phase (M = 14%), F (1, 46) 
= 124.92, p < .001, n
2
p = .73. This main effect of trial was qualified by an interaction 
with age group, F(1, 46) = 7.43, p < .01, n
2
p = .14. Follow-up comparisons with 
Bonferroni adjustments revealed that the 20-month-old group performed significantly 
more activities (M = 73%) than did 16-month-old infants (M = 41%) during the 
generalization phase (p < .001), but not during the baseline phase (16 months: M= 8%; 20 
months: M= 20%, p = .08). Further, an interaction between activity and age was 
discovered, F(1, 46) = 4.26, p = .04, n
2
p = .09, which was qualified by an interaction 
between activity, trial, and age, F(1, 46) = 4.85, p = .03, n
2
p = .10. More specifically, 20-
month-old infants imitated the sensory activities (M = 81%) to a greater extent than did 
16-month-old infants (M = 31%) during the generalization phase, p < .001. This effect 
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and these interactions were further subsumed under a significant four-way interaction 
between activity, trial, exemplar, and age, F(1, 46) = 6.28, p = .02, n
2
p = .12. Each type 
of activity was subjected to pairwise comparisons. During the baseline phase of motion 
trials, 16- and 20-month-old infants chose the person and the animal equally often to 
perform the activity (16 months: M = 2%, M = 8%, respectively, p = .30; 20 months: M = 
15%, M = 6%, respectively, p = .17). Similarly, during the generalization phase of motion 
trials, both the 16- and 20-month-old age groups chose the person and animal equally 
often to perform the target activity (16 months: M = 31%, M = 19 %, respectively, p = 
.23; 20 months: M = 33%, M = 31%, respectively, p = .84).  
A different picture emerged when analyzing children’s responses on the sensory 
activities. During both the baseline and generalization phases of the sensory trials, 16-
month-old infants chose the person and animal equally often to imitate these activities 
(baseline: person M = 2% animal M =4%, p = .69; generalization: person M= 13% animal 
M = 19%, p = .52). In contrast, the 20-month-old infants chose the person and animal 
equally often to imitate the sensory activities only during the baseline phase (M = 13%, M 
= 6%, respectively, p = .23). During generalization, 20-month-old infants imitated the 
sensory activities with a person (M = 52%) significantly more often than with an animal 
(M = 29%), suggesting that by this age, infants are reserving sensory properties for 
people, p = .02. The percentage of responses for 16- and 20-month-old infants on motion 
as well as sensory trials at generalization is illustrated in Figure 2.  
Preschool Task  





Figure 2. Percentage of motion and sensory events performed (+SE) with people and 



































































 Children’s language proficiency was assessed by the PPVT/EVIP-III.  Among the 
English speaking children, there was no significant difference in males’s (M = 110.25, SD  
= 11.79) versus female children’s (M = 116.86, SD = 18.70) performace on the PPVT, 
t(13) = .83, p =  .72, d = .42. French-speaking male (M = 130.50, SD = 6.36) and female 
(M = 126.00, SD = 19.65) children also performed similarly on the PPVT, t(4) = .30, p = 
.47, d = .31. As a group, there was a marginal difference in French-speaking (M= 127.5, 
SD = 15.66) and English-speaking (M=113.33, SD = 15.20) children’s performance on 
the PPVT, though this did not reach statistical significance, t (19) = 1.91, p = .07, d =.92. 
As a result, English and French speaking children were combined in subsequent analyses.  
Theory of Mind and Animacy measures at 72 months.  
              Children’s total ToM scores, which were computed by adding together the scores 
on the Self Belief, Other Belief, Emotion, Desire and Four Sweets tasks, ranged from two 
to five (M = 3.67, SD = 1.07), indicating their understanding of mental states. Our sample 
of children performed better on this ToM battery when compared to Slaughter et al.’s 
(2002) sample of 65-month-old participants’ performance on their ToM scale (M = 2 .81, 
SD = 1.13), which is expected in light of the discrepancy in age between the two groups. 
We conducted a reliability analysis on children’s performance of the five tasks, which 
revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of .65. This finding was comparable to Slaughter et. al’s 
reliability value of .51, indicating good internal reliability on a scale of five items. The 
mean scores on the ToM battery of Experiment 2 are presented in Table 3.  
Children’s performance on the (Animacy) task was coded for percentage of over- 
and under-attribution errors of anatomical (over: 13.8%, under: 26.1%), mental (over: 




The mean scores on the ToM battery administered to preschoolers in Experiment 2. 
 N Mean SD 
False Belief (out of 2) 21 1.57 .68 
Emotion 21  .86 .36 
Desires 21  .52 .51 
Four Sweets 21 .71 .46 





performance on the anatomical and mental properties was comparable to that of Inagaki 
and Sugiyama’s (1988) five-year-old participants (anatomical: over: 6.7%, under: 26.1%;  
mental: over: 48.5%, under: 15.0%). Table 4 shows the percentage of over- and under- 
attribution errors for the three types of properties.  
Longitudinal Analyses  
The relationship between the ability to generalize motion and sensory activities across a 
broad animate domain in infancy and ToM at preschool age  
In this second study as well, the small number of returning participants for the 
preschool study prevented considering the two age groups in the induction study 
separately. As a result, both age groups were pooled and results are presented as group 
averages. The objective of this first set of analyses was to determine whether the ability 
to generalize sensory activities to people rather than animals in infancy predicts ToM 
ability at preschool age. This was done by generating the correlation between the total 
amount of times (maximum score out of two) infants chose the person over the animal for 
the sensory activities at 16 or 20 months and ToM ability at 64 months, as measured by a 
total ToM score (maximum score out of five). Children’s performance on the infancy 
task, as measured by this total score, did not predict ToM ability at preschool age, r(21)= 
-.05, p=.83. Another total score was calculated which reflected children’s understandings 
that motion properties were appropriate to a broad animate domain consisting of both 
people and animals. This was done by calculating the total amount of times (maximum 
score out of four) infants chose either the animal or the person for the motion activities. 





The mean percentages of under- and over-attribution errors for each type of property on 
the animacy task in Experiment 2 
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domain in infancy predicts ToM ability at preschool age, we correlated this latter total 
score on the infancy task with ToM ability at 64 months, as measured by the total ToM  
score. Here too, performance on the infancy task did not predict ToM ability at preschool 
age, r(21)=-.10,p=.65. 
A second set of analyses was conducted to further examine this longitudinal 
relationship. In this case, a difference score was obtained from the inductive 
generalization task as the difference between the number of times the infant chose the 
person to model the sensory activities at generalization and the number of times the infant 
chose the person to do so at baseline. Recall that infants were presented with both a 
person and an animal exemplar at generalization. A higher score on this difference score 
measure would therefore indicate that infants chose the person more often than the 
animal at generalization for the sensory activities, while taking into account their baseline 
performance. This would suggest that infants correctly understood that people were more 
appropriate than animals to perform the sensory activities. To examine whether 
performance on the infancy task using this difference score predicted performance on the 
preschool ToM task, a Pearson correlation was conducted between the difference score 
on the induction task and the total ToM score. No statistical significant correlation was 
found r(21)=.00, p=1.00. Another difference score was calculated to reflect children’s 
understanding that motion properties can be generalized to a broad animate domain, 
taking into account their baseline performance. In this case, the difference between the 
amount of times infants chose either the animal or person to perform motion activities at 
generalization and the amount of times they did so at baseline was calculated. No 
significant correlation was found between this latter difference score measure and ToM 
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ability at preschool age, r(21)= .03, p=.90. All four of the measures stated above 
remained non significant when the PPVT was partialed out.  
An analysis examining the relationship between performance on the infancy task 
and false belief understanding at preschool age, as measured by children’s understanding 
of False-Belief, was conducted. Success on the false-belief task was defined as a perfect 
score out of two. A point-biserial correlation, due to the presence of one dichotomous 
variable and one continuous various, was conducted between the total amount of times 
infants chose the person (out of two) to model the sensory activities in the induction task 
and scores on the false belief task. This point-biserial correlation was not significant 
rpb(21)=.06, p=.81, nor was the relationship between the difference score (as the 
difference between the number of times the infant chose the person to model the sensory 
activities at generalization and the number of times the infant chose the person to do so at 
baseline) on the infancy task and knowledge of false belief rpb(21)=.00, p=1.00.  
Lastly, an analysis was conducted to explore whether children who passed the 
false-belief task had a better understanding of the animate-inanimate distinction at 
infancy than those who failed the false-belief task. Children who passed the false-belief 
task (N=67%) were not more likely to choose the person over the animal at generalization 
(on sensory trials) than those who failed the false-belief task (N=33%), t(19)=-2.4, p=.81.  
The relationship between the ability to generalize motion and sensory activities across a 
broad animate domain in infancy and knowledge of animacy at preschool age  
In this second set of analyses, we sought to determine whether there exists a 
longitudinal relationship between knowledge of the animate-inanimate distinction at 16 
or 20 months and a more developed understanding of living and non-living kinds at 72 
74 
 
months. Infants’ performance on the inductive generalization task as measured by the 
total amount of times (maximum score out of two) infants chose the person over the 
animal for the sensory activities at 16 or 20 months failed to correlate with performance 
on the Animacy task, as measured by children’s under- and over-attribution errors for 
both the anatomical (under: r(21)=.08, p=.72; over: r(21)=.26, p=.26) and mental (under: 
r(21)=-.07, p=.76; over: r(21)=-.00, p=.98) properties. Using the total amount of times 
(maximum score out of four) infants chose either the animal or the person for the motion 
activities in the induction task as a measure of infants’ knowledge of the broad animate 
domain also failed to correlate with performance on the Animacy task, as measured by 
children’s under- and over-attribution errors for both the anatomical (under: r(21)=-.29, 
p=.20; over: r(21)=.05, p=.82; ) and mental (under: r(21)=-.20, p=.39; over: r(21)=.17, 
p=.46).  
We also ran correlations using difference score measures as reflective of infants’ 
performance on the induction task. For the first analysis of this kind, a difference score 
was obtained from the inductive generalization task as the difference between the number 
of times the infant chose the person to model the sensory activities at generalization and 
the number of times the infant chose the person to do so at baseline. This difference score 
measure failed to correlate with performance on the Animacy task, as measured by 
children’s under- and over-attribution errors for both the anatomical (under: r(21)=-.07, 
p= .76; over: r(21)=.11, p=.63) and mental (under: r(21)= -.13, p=.57; over: r(21)=.00, 
p=.97) properties. A similar analysis using another difference score measure (the 
difference between the amount of times infants chose either the animal or person to 
perform motion activities at generalization and the amount of times they did so at 
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baseline) on the induction task also failed to yield any significant results when correlated 
with children’s under- and over-attribution errors for the anatomical (under: r(21)= .22, 
p= .35; over: r(21)=.01, p= .96) and mental (under: r(21)= .07, p=.76; over: r(21)= .04, 
p=.87) properties.  
The concurrent relationship between ToM and knowledge of animacy at preschool age  
In this third set of analyses, we examined whether ToM ability and knowledge of 
living and non-living kinds are concurrently related at the preschool age. Children’s 
performance on the Animacy task, as measured by the proportion of over-attribution 
errors on the anatomical properties correlated significantly with their performance on the 
ToM task, r(21)=-.48, p=.03. This relationship remained significant even after the PPVT 
was partialed out, r(18)=-.47, p=.04. However, children’s performance on the Animacy 
task as measured the proportion of under-attribution errors on the anatomical properties 
as well as by the proportion of over- and under-attribution errors on the mental properties 
failed to correlate with knowledge of false belief (anatomical: under r(21)= .01, p=.96; 
mental: over: r(21)= .15, p=.51, under: r(21)=-.36, p=.11). The intercorrelations between 
performance on the infancy task and knowledge of ToM and animacy at preschool age 





Intercorrelations between children's performance on the infant generalized imitation task 
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The development of a theory of mind (ToM) has established itself as one of the 
most prevalent research topics in the field of evolutionary, developmental, and clinical 
psychology in recent years. From an evolutionary perspective, the question of how ToM 
has evolved and whether the possession of a ToM is specific to human beings has 
intrigued philosophers and scientists alike. From a developmental standpoint, questions 
and hypotheses abound about the onset and progression of ToM knowledge and key 
developmental milestones. In turn, neuroscientists have addressed the question of 
whether mentalizing abilities are subserved by specific, dedicated mechanisms and have 
thus spurred extensive research on the neural basis of such complex mental states as 
desires, beliefs, and intentions. Research on ToM has also expanded beyond the realm of 
developmental psychology to include developmental and clinical psychopathology, with 
the hypothesis that deficiencies in ToM may account for neurodevelopmental disorders 
such as autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995). One of the most intriguing findings related to ToM 
knowledge is that autistic children seem to be significantly impaired in their ability to 
understand people as mental beings, which has prompted the proposal that a specific 
developmental delay in ToM is involved in childhood autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985).  
Despite this plethora of research on ToM, significantly fewer empirical 
investigations have addressed the various claims that specific early social-cognitive 
abilities serve as precursors to a more mature ToM. Surprisingly, only recently have 
researchers started to rest this continuity hypothesis between ToM precursors, such as 
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imitation, joint attention, and intentional understanding, and children’s later ToM 
abilities.  
The current study is the first to examine a longitudinal association between 
infants’ early understanding of the A-I distinction and their more developed 
understanding of ToM. Considering that the ability to categorize objects into animate and 
inanimate domains, an ability which arises early in infancy, is considered a major 
milestone in cognitive development (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001), it is conceivable 
that the A-I distinction is another potential precursor to ToM. While important theories of 
children’s mental abilities have traditionally considered biological understanding as a key 
component (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002), significantly less focus has been paid to the 
relationship between naïve psychology and naïve biology. As such, little is known about 
the extent of children’s understanding across both naïve psychology and naïve biology. 
Furthermore, the developmental origins of naïve biology remain largely unknown, though 
the A-I distinction has been put forth as a potential precursor (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). 
The current research therefore attempted to fill a gap in our knowledge of precursors of 
both naïve psychology and naïve biology by examining how the A-I distinction in 
infancy is related to later ToM and animacy concepts.  
One of the central finding of the present study is the possibility of a longitudinal 
association between children’s performance on the categorization task in infancy and 
their later understanding of ToM in Experiment 1. Specifically, it appears that infants’ 
understanding that animals and not vehicles play the role of agents in motion and sensory 
events, somewhat predicted their later ability to pass the false-belief task. Although this 
finding was only marginally significant, it does raise intriguing questions about the 
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reason for continuity between infants’ early understanding of animacy and their later 
understanding that people’s beliefs may differ from reality. Obviously, to hold a false 
belief or any other mental state, one must at least be animate. This is consistent with 
previous studies which have also found a correlation between early infant abilities and 
false belief performance at preschool age. For instance, Aschersleben, Hofer, and 
Jovanovic (2008) found that infants’ decrement of attention to goal-directed action at six 
months of age was significantly related to their ability to pass a false belief task at four 
years. However, there is more to ToM than passing a false belief task. The failure to find 
an association between knowledge of the A-I distinction in infancy and the ToM battery 
as a whole suggests that any potential link between the A-I distinction in infancy and 
ToM at preschool age is very specific. This may be due to the fact that false belief is the 
most mature form of mentalizing, and the task (unlike others in the battery) that people 
with autism fail (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Furthermore, it is very 
possible that our small sample size may have obscured this underlying relationship and 
replication of these findings with a larger participant pool is warranted. As well, it is 
important to point out that a cognitive control measure at the preschool age (such as a 
measure of IQ) was not included. Therefore, it remains to be determined whether the 
observation of a longitudinal association between children’s performance on the 
categorization task in infancy and their later understanding of ToM reflects a domain-
specific effect or simply an indication that individual differences in domain-general 
abilities were observed. Future research should re-examine the relation between early 
concepts of animacy and overall ToM ability. A wider range of infancy tasks designed to 
assess a broader understanding of the animacy concept might be better suited to predict 
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ToM knowledge at preschool age. Also, the inclusion of tasks that tap domain-general 
cognitive abilities such as IQ are warranted.  
The proposal that the A-I distinction in infancy may also be linked to later, more 
advanced, knowledge of naïve biology was another issue investigated for the first time in 
the present study. The ability to distinguish between living (animate) and non-living 
(inanimate) beings is fundamental not only for biological understanding but also for 
classifying objects into broad categories. In fact, researchers have considered the types of 
questions posed by children about living and artificial kinds as a means of determining 
the properties that children deem essential for conceptual categorization (Greif, Kemler-
Nelson, Keil, & Gutierre, 2006). Greif et al. found that when preschool aged children 
inquired about unfamiliar artifacts and animals, they were more likely to ask about 
functions and behaviours for the artifacts (e.g. what is it for?) than about biologically 
relevant properties (e.g. eating behavior), which they reserved for animals. The results 
speak to children’s conceptual knowledge of categories of living and non-living things, 
and “reveal a deep-seated conceptual contrast between animals and artifacts” (Greif et al., 
p. 458). Interestingly, results from Experiment 1 showed that performance on the A-I task 
administered in infancy strongly predicted performance on the animacy task at preschool 
age, even when language skills were controlled for. That is, infants’ understanding of the 
conceptual categories of animate and inanimate beings was linked to a later 
understanding of animacy, whereby children who understood that animals are more 
appropriate than vehicles to perform both sensory and motion events had a better 
understanding of the concept of animacy at preschool age. This finding provides 
preliminary evidence of developmental continuity between the A-I distinction in infancy 
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and a later more developed form of naïve biology, supporting the proposal that 
conceptual knowledge of animate and inanimate beings in infancy may indeed be a 
precursor to later biological understanding. Further, this is also an important finding in 
that domain specificity was established by the presence of a longitudinal relationship 
between two tasks that are thought to measure a common construct (i.e. animacy).  
Another important finding that emerged from Experiment 1 was the discovery of 
a significant concurrent relationship between performance on the animacy and ToM tasks 
at preschool age. This suggests that the ability to reason about mental states is, to some 
extent, related to preschoolers’ understanding of animacy (living/non-living) and 
sentiency (knowing/wanting). This is a reasonable notion in light of the function and 
exclusivity of certain mental states for a subset of animate beings. Specifically, animates 
are creatures that “know, perceive, emote, learn, and think” (Gelman & Spelke, 1981, 
p.45). This association between biological understanding and ToM lend credence to 
Inagaki and Hatano’s (2002) claim that by four years of age, children have acquired a 
certain kind of biological framework for thinking about living things and extends this 
claim to include the idea that this biological framework might also be linked to children’s 
knowledge of people as causal agents. This is further supported by the consistency in 
children’s responses across the different categories of questions on the animacy-
acceptability task. That is, preschoolers had a similar level of understanding of both 
animacy and sentiency at this age, suggesting that perhaps by this age, there is 




              The findings obtained in Experiment 2 are less clear. It is important to note that 
the infancy induction task in Experiment 2 did not address the animate-inanimate 
distinction directly. That is, both the test exemplars (animals, people) as well as the 
model used to imitate the events (a monkey doll) were all animate beings. The key effect 
of the induction study, therefore, was the more frequent choice of the person over the 
animal for the sensory events than for the motion events, suggestive of some initial form 
of ToM knowledge. That is, the choice of the person over the animals might be indicative 
that infants have an early understanding that people have visual and auditory experiences 
that may not be applicable to animals. With this in mind, the fact that we did not find a 
relationship between the performance in the infancy task and later performance on ToM 
battery or false belief is unexpected. It may be that our choice of sensory properties 
(looking into a mirror, listening on a phone) was not a sensitive enough measure of 
infants’ ability to infer ‘psychological’ properties exclusively to people. As such, it would 
be imperative for future research to assess if infants’ ability to infer a wider range of 
psychological attributes to people would predict performance on a battery of ToM at 
preschool age.   
In contrast to Experiment 1, we did not find a longitudinal relationship between 
performance on the induction generalization task in infancy and the animacy task at 
preschool age in Experiment 2. Despite the argument for continuity in the development of 
naïve theories put forth by various researchers in the field (e.g. Charman et al. 2000, 
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005, 2007), we found little direct empirical evidence in 
Experiment 2 to support this theoretical position. The lack of findings in Experiment 2 to 
support the existence of continuity might be interpreted as support for Inakgaki and Hatano’s 
(1993, 2002) view that psychological and biological domains function independently of one 
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another and that naïve psychology is simply a ‘neighboring’ theory that can at times penetrate 
into biological reasoning during that time when naïve biology is establishing itself. While this 
is plausible, it may also be that the two tasks employed in this experiment did not measure 
abilities sufficiently similar to establish continuity between the two time points. The 
small sample size could also have been a factor in why continuity was not established.  
Here too, a broader range of tasks that measure infants’ ability to attribute biological 
properties might be better able to tap into infants’ naïve biology knowledge and perhaps 
then establish continuity with later animacy knowledge, as measured by tasks such as 
Inagaki and Sugiyama’s (1998). In addition, subsequent research should perhaps include 
tasks that employ methodological paradigms other than imitation to measure knowledge 
of animacy in infancy. Certainly, future research should address these issues. 
The concurrent relationship between ToM and animacy at preschool age in 
Experiment 2 was also supported by a relationship between children’s proportion of over-
attribution errors on the anatomical properties and their performance on the ToM task. 
This relationship remained even when the effect of language was taken into account. In 
light of how little is known about children’s understanding across both naïve psychology 
and naïve biology, this original finding strengthens the idea that there exists a relationship 
betweedn children’s core domains of thought.  Furthermore, it may also support the 
notion that the A-I distinction in infancy is indeed a precursor to the living/nonliving 
distinction (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002), but that naïve biology may simply be hard to test in 
infancy (and why consequently longitudinal findings are difficult to obtain), while the 
concurrent relationship between knowledge of biological properties and ToM at 
preschool age is more easily discernible.  
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Overall, the results of this set of studies are promising. Importantly, preliminary 
evidence was found for a developmental progression between the early understanding of 
A-I distinction and later knowledge of false belief at preschool age. As well, 
developmental continuity between the A-I distinction in infancy and a more developed 
form of naïve biology at preschool age was established, supporting Inagaki and Hatano’s 
(2002) proposal that the A-I distinction in infancy might be a potential precursor to later 
naïve biology (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). As previously mentioned, there are a number of 
notable limitations to the present set of studies. The small sample size, the lack of a 
relationship between performance on the infancy task and later performance on the global 
ToM battery, as well as the relatively limited aspects of animacy and sentiency that were 
measured in infancy are worth mentioning here. As well, the high number of correlations 
that were run on such a small sample size may have resulted in an increased risk of type I 
error. Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings establish the way for future research 
to further explore whether ToM knowledge has its roots in naïve biology and naïve 
psychology.  
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Contribution of Authors  
This section details the contributions of the first author in the article entitled 
“Domain-general categorization in young children with autism.” The first experiment 
with typically developing children reported in this paper was conducted in the Cognitive 
Development Laboratory in the Centre for Research in Human Development at 
Concordia University, Montreal. The second experiment with autistic children was 
conducted at the child psychiatry department at the Montreal Children's Hospital of the 
McGill University Health Centre (MUHC). 
 The experimental methodology and research design for the first study was 
designed collaboratively by the second and third authors. The third author gathered the 
testing stimuli, devised administration orders (i.e., counterbalancing), and wrote the 
recruitment letters and consent forms for the first study. The data from this experiment 
was submitted as part of the third author’s Masters thesis which was supervised by the 
second author. The experimental methodology and research design for the second study 
reported in this paper was designed collaboratively by the first and second authors. The 
first author gathered the testing stimuli, devised administration orders (i.e., 
counterbalancing), and wrote the consent forms.  
 A total of 31 typically developing children were tested in the first study and 16 
children with autism spectrum disorder were tested in the second study. All the 
participants in the first study were tested by the third author who also explained the 
procedure to the parents. The participants in the second study were all tested by the first 
author, who met with the parents of these autistic children and explained the procedure 
and rational of the study to them.   
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  With regards to coding and data analysis, the third author coded all of the 
children's responses in the first experiment by viewing taped recordings of the testing 
sessions. A second coder, naïve to the experimental hypotheses, independently coded 
25% of the infants and inter-rater reliability was obtained. The third author then inputted 
the data into an SPSS worksheet and conducted all subsequent analyses. With respect to 
the second experiment, the first author coded all of the children’s responses by viewing 
the taped recordings of the testing sessions. A second, independent coder, then coded a 
random selection of 29% of the children and overall inter-rater reliability was obtained. 
The first author inputted the data from this study into an SPSS worksheet and conducted 
all subsequent analyses on this study and on the comparative results of both experiments.  
The first author wrote the abstract, introduction, results, and discussion sections of 
the first experiment reported in this paper. The methods section of Experiment 1 was 
written by the third author. For the second experiment, the first author wrote the 
introduction, method, results, and discussion sections. All sections were reviewed and 
commented upon by the second author. The final draft of the paper was reviewed and 









The sequential touching task was administered to a group of typically developing 
18-month-old infants and to a group of young autistic children in order to evaluate their 
ability to form an animate-inanimate distinction at the domain level. The typically 
developing infants categorized at the domain level whereas the autistic children 
categorized at the global but not the domain level. These findings suggest that typically 
developing children can form categories at a higher level of inclusiveness than has 
previously been demonstrated and that children with autism possess a concept of 
animacy, although this knowledge might be narrower than typically developing children.  
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Domain-General Categorization in Children with Autism  
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a rare, yet severe and lifelong 
neurodevelopmental syndrome. One of the most striking and recognized symptoms of 
ASD is an impairment in the realm of processing social information, notably faces. 
Behaviourally, this social information processing deficit is translated into a tendency to 
withdraw socially and to engage in atypical eye contact, both of which are regarded as 
core clinical features of ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In recent years, 
considerable research has focused on different aspects of this social information 
processing impairment in both adults and children with ASD.  
For instance, a number of studies on face processing in children and adults with 
ASD have demonstrated deficits in abilities such as remembering unfamiliar faces 
(Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Gepner, de Gelder, & de Schonen, 1996; Riby, Doherty-
Sneddon, & Bruce, 2009) and recognizing previously familiar faces (Boucher, Lewis, & 
Collis, 1998). Electroencephalographic (ERP) studies of face recognition in both children 
(Dawson et al., 2002) and adults (McPartland, Dawson, Webb, Panagiotides, & Carver, 
2004) with ASD have supplemented the previous findings by providing further evidence 
of a face recognition deficit in ASD. There is also substantial evidence of a deficit in the 
ability to follow eye gaze in ASD (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & 
Walker, 1995; Leekam, López, & Moore, 2000). Indeed, autistic children as young as 20 
months of age have been shown to demonstrate atypical eye gaze. In a study by 
Swettenham et al., (1998), 20 month old infants with autism were compared to two 
control groups (typically developing and non-autistic developmentally delayed) in terms 
of their spontaneous looking behaviour during a free play session. The authors found that 
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the autistic infants spent less time looking at people than did both control groups and 
spent more time looking at objects.  
The ability to recognize facial expressions or to decipher facial emotions has also 
been found to be problematic among autistic individuals (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, O’Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007; Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; 
Gepner et al., 1996; Teunisse & de Gelder, 1994). For instance, Riby et al. (2009) 
investigated the perception of a variety of facial cues, such as identity, eye-gaze, lip 
reading, and facial emotional expressions among autistic individuals between the ages of 
six and sixteen years. The results indicated that the autistic individuals had greater 
difficulty with eye-gaze and expression processing when compared to individuals with 
Williams Syndrome and individuals with a developmental delay.  
In a study on brain activation in autistic individuals, Castelli, Frith, Happé and 
Frith (2002) suggested that the ability to perceive social information is linked to the 
processing of biological motion. Indeed, a myriad of studies have shown that typically 
developing infants, older children, and adults can distinguish biological from mechanical 
motion (Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Tremoulet & 
Feldman, 2000). According to Rutherford, Pennington, & Rogers (2006), motion 
properties serve as the foundation upon which people are capable of perceiving social 
information. In the case of autism, recent research seems to suggest that individuals with 
ASD do not recognize biological motion in the same way that normally developing 
people do. In one such study, Blake, Turner, Smorski, Pozdol, & Stone (2003) looked at 
whether a deficit in perceiving motion is linked to the social deficits apparent in ASD. 
The authors tested children with and without ASD on their ability to distinguish 
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biological from non-biological motion using point-light displays depicting normal 
biological arrangements as well as scrambled arrangements. The amount of time it took 
participants to recognize the point-light displays as ‘a person’ was examined. Although 
children with ASD performed equally well on a separate visual discrimination task 
compared to typically developing children, their performance on the point light display 
task was considerably impaired. That is, the autistic children had greater difficulty 
discriminating biological from non-biological motion than did their mental-age-matched 
controls. Additional studies using point-light display methods have produced somewhat 
consistent findings (Milne et al., 2002; Spencer et al., 2000).  
In 2006, Rutherford et al. further examined the question of whether children with 
ASD can perceive animate motion much like typically developing children do. The 
authors reasoned that since the ability to discriminate animate from inanimate motion is a 
potential precursor for later social development in typically developing children, then the 
social deficit evident in autistic children might be linked to an early inability to 
discriminate animate motion from inanimate motion. Children with ASD and age-
matched controls were shown simple geometric figures that moved on a computer screen 
in either an animate manner (i.e., accelerated, decelerated, or propelled itself) or 
inanimate manner (i.e., in response to impact or gravity) and were asked to identify 
which of the two figures moved as if it were animate. The results showed that in the 
initial training phase, children with ASD were impaired in their ability to categorize 
objects as animate compared to control groups. However, this deficit seemed to disappear 
once the children had mastered the ability to perceive animacy in the test phase. The 
authors interpreted these findings to suggest that “the mechanisms that perceive animacy 
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are functional in autism and perhaps need to be primed, or that these children are able to 
quickly develop compensatory strategies” (p. 989).  
Despite findings indicating that the detection of biological motion is impaired in 
individuals with ASD, there exist a number of studies to the contrary suggesting that the 
ability to detect biological motion cues is not affected in the autistic population. Moore, 
Hobson, and Lee (1997), for instance, found that children with ASD performed equally 
well as non-autistic children on tasks measuring the perception of biological motion. 
Fourteen-year-old participants with autism and age-matched controls (non-autistic 
children with mental retardation (MR) matched on verbal ability and chronological age) 
were asked to recognize human activity based on point-light animation displays. The 
results showed no statistically significant difference in the ability of the autistic and non-
autistic individuals to recognize animate activity in brief point-light displays, even when 
the displays were shown for less than half a second. However, when it came to perceiving 
emotion-related attitudes and mental states based on motion cues, the autistic participants 
were significantly less capable of doing so than controls. More recently, Hubert et al., 
(2007) re-examined the question of biological motion perception among high-functioning 
adolescents and adults with autism, Asperger Syndrome and typically developing 
individuals matched on chorological age (CA) and gender. Participants were shown 
point-light displays of human actions, subjective states, and emotional actions. Consistent 
with Moore et al’s findings, the authors found that the autistic and Asperger subjects 
were capable of perceiving biological and non-biological activity, but were significantly 
impaired in their ability to describe emotional states depicted in the point-light displays 
of bodily actions.  
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The extent to which autistic children possess a concept of animacy is an intriguing 
question. According to Mandler (1992, 2000), the processing of dynamic properties of 
objects (including biological motion) is fundamental for the early ability to recognize 
objects as either animate or inanimate, an ability which is considered a cognitive 
milestone in typical development (Gelman & Opfer, 2002; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 
2001). The literature on infants’ earliest categorical distinctions points to differing 
perspectives on the development of the animate-inanimate (A-I) distinction in infancy. 
Objects can be categorized at different levels of abstraction. For example, the basic-level 
category ‘dogs’ belongs to the global category ‘animals,’ which itself belongs to the 
larger ontological category of ‘animate beings’ (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Along these 
lines, it has been proposed that infants begin by forming basic-level categories that are 
easily distinguishable based on perceptual cues, and that eventually, these categorical 
representations become conceptually-based.  
A different view on the development of categorization in infancy suggests that 
although early categories do not correspond to the global or ontological level of adults, 
they are indeed broad in nature (Mandler & Bauer, 1988; Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 
1998). A large body of research supports the hypothesis that global categories actually 
develop before basic-level categories during the first two years of life (Mandler, 2000; 
Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 1991; Mandler & McDonough, 1998; Pauen, 2002; 
Poulin-Dubois, Graham, & Sippola, 1995). Both featural (faces, contour) and dynamic 
(contingent motion, self-propulsion) information is used by infants to form these broad 
categories (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). In one study, 16-month-old typically 
developing infants generalized motion properties from people to animals, suggesting that 
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by this age, infants consider biological motion as appropriate to the broad animate 
domain (Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, & Johnson, 2006). The conventional 
approach to the study of infants’ and children’s category knowledge has been the 
inductive generalization paradigm which involves the imitation of properties modeled. 
While appropriate when conducting studies with a typically developing population, an 
approach that relies upon modeling or imitation is not suitable when testing autistic 
children given the latter’s imitative deficit (Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Rogers & 
Williams, 2006; Smith & Bryson, 1994).  
Another paradigm often used to study infant categorization is the sequential 
touching procedure. This technique involves presenting infants with an array of objects 
consisting of exemplars from two categories (e.g., animals and vehicles). The touching 
behavior of the infants is examined in order to determine whether there is any systematic 
order to their touches. Infants are considered to have categorized the objects if they touch 
multiple objects from the same category before touching objects from the other category. 
Studies using the sequential touching procedure have found that typically developing 
infants can categorize objects at a basic level at 16- and 20-months of age, though only 
when the basic-level categories could be subsumed under differing superordinate 
categories (Mandler & Bauer, 1988). Specifically, these authors found that infants could 
categorize dogs vs. cars (dissimilar superordinate-level categories) but not cars vs. trucks 
(similar superordinate-level category) and therefore posited that the understanding of 
superordinate-level categories develops prior to that of basic-level categories. Mandler et 
al., (1991) found similar results using a sequential touching task with 18-month-old 
infants. That is, infants were able to differentiate superordinate-level categories (animals 
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vs. vehicles) but not basic-level categories of low contrast (e.g., dogs vs. horses) or 
moderate contrast (e.g., cars vs. motorcycles). The only evidence of basic-level 
categorization was found using a high degree of contrast (e.g., dogs vs. fish). By 30 
months of age the infants were capable of discriminating low and moderate degrees of 
contrast at the basic level. This area of research was extended by Poulin-Dubois et al. 
(1995) to include superordinate-, basic-, and subordinate-level categories. Using a 
sequential touching task, the authors found evidence of superordinate-level categorization 
(e.g., animals vs. furniture) by 15 months of age, followed by basic-level categorization 
(e.g., cars vs. trucks) at around 20 months of age. The infants did not display evidence of 
subordinate-level categorization (e.g., collies vs. German shepherds) even by 25 months 
of age.  
Evidence of the obtainment of superordinate-level categorization prior to that of 
basic-level categorization has been found with even younger infants using the object 
examination procedure in which infants are presented, one at a time, objects from one 
category followed by a novel object from a different category. The amount of time the 
infant took to examine the item from the new category is measured. Using this task, 
Mandler and McDonough (1993) found that both 9- and 11-month-old infants were found 
to categorize superordinate-level categories of animals and vehicles. Using the same task, 
Pauen (2002) discovered that 8-month-old infants were capable of categorizing objects at 
the superordinate level, but not at the basic level. By 12 months of age, the same infants 
were able to demonstrate basic-level categorization. Taken together these results support 




Research on categorization processes in ASD is somewhat limited. In 1987, 
Ungerer and Sigman examined autistic children’s ability to sort objects into categories 
using perceptual (e.g., color) and functional (e.g., furniture) cues. Preschool-aged autistic 
and MR children were matched on chronological age (CA), mental age (MA), and IQ. A 
third comparison group consisted of typically developing children matched on CA. Using 
the sequential touching paradigm, the authors found no significant differences among the 
autistic, MR or typically developing children in the percentage of objects touched that 
belonged to the same category, for both the perceptual and functional tasks. That is, 
autistic children were as capable of forming categories based on function, form, and color 
as MR and MA matched normally developing children. Other early studies of 
categorization abilities in autistic individuals have produced similar findings, suggesting 
that category formation based on spatial or perceptual attributes in ASD is not impaired 
(Lancy & Goldstein, 1982; Tager-Flusberg, 1985).  
A growing number of studies seem to suggest that individuals with ASD can 
successfully form categories when categorization is based on simple, perceptual cues but 
have greater difficulty when more abstract or complex reasoning is required. For 
instance, Shulman, Yirmiya, and Greenbaum (1995), found that when classification was 
based on perceptual features, such as the ability to sort geometric shapes, autistic 
children’s performance on sorting tasks was comparable to that of children with MR and 
normally developing children. In contrast, the autistic children’s ability to sort 
representational objects (based on more abstract criteria) was significantly impaired in 
comparison to the other groups of children. Several other studies lend credence to the 
notion that categorization or concept formation based on more abstract or superordinate 
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representations is problematic for individuals with ASD (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; 
Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 2002; Plaisted, 2000).  
It has been suggested that a deficit in understanding biological motion properties 
in ASD could be manifested as a disability to group categories together, specifically that 
of abstract or global categories for animates and inanimates. Only one other study has 
examined whether children with ASD are able to use information about motion properties 
to form an A-I distinction (Johnson & Rakison, 2006). Using a modified version of the 
inductive generalization task, 11 children diagnosed with ASD were administered four 
separate events, each depicting a different type of motion appropriate to either animates 
(e.g., a dog walking) or inanimates (e.g., a car rolling). Following a baseline phase during 
which children explored the objects, the experimenter modeled four target motions with 
toy replicas of animals or vehicles. The child was then encouraged to imitate the 
previously modeled motion for the generalization part of the study. The test exemplars 
consisted of props that differed in terms of whether or not they belonged to the 
superordinate category of the motion tested and in whether or not they possessed the 
correct and functional parts for the motion. The authors found that children with ASD 
correctly generalized functional parts for animate (i.e., legs for non-linear trajectories) 
and inanimate (i.e., wheels for linear trajectories) land motions, even if the props did not 
belong to the correct superordinate category (e.g., using a table to imitate a non-linear 
land motion); performance that the authors maintain is consistent with that of 18-month-
old typically developing children and is suggestive of a rule-based approach to 
categorization. In contrast, the children correctly generalized to the superordinate 
category for both animate (e.g., an eagle flying non-linearly) and inanimate (e.g., a plane 
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flying linearly) air motions. Although the current findings seem to suggest that children 
with ASD have an understanding of the motion properties specific to animates and 
inanimates, it is important to note that the highest percentage of action obtained in this 
study was 24%, which is considerably less than that observed among typically 
developing children. In Mandler and McDonough’s 1996 study, for example, the 
percentage of action with the target exemplar at generalization reached 67%, with similar 
results also obtained when atypical animal and vehicle exemplars were used. Further, the 
methodology used in Johnson and Rakison’s (2006) study to assess children’s knowledge 
of the motion properties of animate and inanimates is questionable with an ASD 
population in light of research supporting an autism-specific deficit in imitation 
(Charman et al., 1997; Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse, & Wehner, 2003).  
Surprisingly, to date, no study has examined whether infants can form categories 
at a higher level of inclusiveness than animals, people, vehicles, and furniture. For 
example, if infants start with a broad animate category, they should group people and 
animals together in one category. Similarly, if they possess a broad inanimate category, 
they should group vehicles and furniture together. The main goal of the current paper was 
to examine young autistic children’s ability to categorize animate and inanimate objects 
at a domain-general level. In Experiment 1, a control group of typically developing 
children was administered a sequential touching task to assess their knowledge of the 
broad A-I distinction. The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine young autistic children’s 
ability to form this domain-general, A-I distinction. Previous research examining the 
categorization abilities of autistic children has mainly used tasks in which geometric 
figures are employed (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, 1985). As such, small replicas of real-life 
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objects were used in order to determine whether autistic children can classify objects into 
animate and inanimate categories using the sequential touching task.  
Experiment 1 
The goal of the current study was to examine typically developing infants’ 
understanding of the broad, domain-general, A-I distinction.  
Method  
Participants  
Thirty-one 18-month-old infants (M age = 18.61 months, SD = .65, range = 17.41 
to 19.67 months) participated in Experiment 1. The sample consisted of 19 males and 12 
females. Two additional infants participated but were excluded due to parental 
interference (N = 1) and fussiness (N = 1). Families were recruited through birth lists 
provided by a governmental health office. All infants were born full-term and had no 
visual or auditory difficulties as reported by parents. See Appendix J for a sample 
recruitment letter.  
Materials and Procedure  
Small, plastic three-dimensional objects were used. The animate domain 
exemplars consisted of eight people (African American man, African American woman, 
African American boy, African American girl, Caucasian man, Caucasian woman, 
Caucasian boy, Caucasian girl) and four animals (dog, cow, dolphin, eagle). The 
inanimate domain exemplars consisted of four vehicles (truck, car, boat, airplane) and 
four pieces of furniture (chair, desk, bed, bathtub). The objects were presented to the 
infant on a 44.80 x 34.60 cm tray. A brown cloth was used to cover the objects, and a 
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stopwatch was used to monitor trial length. The testing session was recorded through a 
Sony video camera on a Hi-8 video cassette tape.  
The infants and their parent(s) were greeted in a reception room arranged as a 
playroom. During a brief warm-up period, the experimenter interacted and played with 
the infant to familiarize him/her with the new environment and the experimenter. During 
this time, the parent was asked to sign a consent form and to complete a participant 
questionnaire. Once the child appeared comfortable with the setting, the parents and their 
child were brought to the testing room. A sample parent consent form is provided in 
Appendix K.  
The infant was seated either on his or her parent’s lap or in a clip-on chair 
attached to the table, with the parent sitting directly behind. The experimenter was seated 
directly across the table from the infant. Prior to the testing session, the objects were 
selected from one of six testing arrays. Each array consisted of eight objects, four from 
the animate domain and four from the inanimate domain. These objects were arranged on 
the tray in a random fashion, and then covered with the brown cloth. The tray was kept 
on a table next to the experimenter, and was out of the infant’s view. After the infant was 
seated, the tray was placed on the table in front of the experimenter, but out of the 
infant’s reach. The experimenter removed the cloth and made a sweeping hand motion 
over the tray while saying “Look at all of these toys. These are all for you.” The tray was 
then pushed towards the child, and he or she was given 2 min to freely manipulate the 
objects. No further prompting was given unless the child did not touch any new object (or 
touched no objects) for more than 30 s, in which case the sweeping hand motion and 
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original statement were repeated. If an object fell off the table, the parent or experimenter 
picked it up and inconspicuously placed it back on the tray.  
Coding and Scoring  
Children’s sequential touching behaviour was coded. Consistent with previous 
studies employing the sequential touching task (Mandler, Fivush, & Reznick, 1987; 
Poulin-Dubois et al., 1995; Rakison & Butterworth, 1998), a ‘touch’ was coded when the 
child made physical contact with an object, either with his/her own hand, finger, or with 
the use of another object. The touch must have been judged as intentional, with the child 
focused on the object being touched (Oakes et al., 1996). Accidental touches (e.g., 
coming into contact with an object while reaching for another) did not qualify as a 
‘touch.’ As well, a coding scheme was developed based on the rules outlined in Poulin-
Dubois et al. (1995) and Starkey (1981). Specifically: 1) coding began once all the toys 
were presented on the table and the child touched a toy, 2) if a delay of more than 10 s 
occurred between touches, a break in the sequence of objects touched was recorded. The 
10 s break criterion is used in sequential touching coding because if a significant length 
of time has passed between two touches, the infant may not make any conceptual link 
between them. That is, a touch to the desk exemplar followed 25 s later by a touch to the 
truck exemplar may not be evidence of inanimate categorization. However, a short time 
interval between touches can be interpreted as more likely that the child has associated 
the two objects. If a 10 s break was recorded, it would interrupt any ongoing run, 3) a 
touch was not counted as a part of the sequence if the child’s touch was a result of the 
experimenter or parent drawing his or her attention to the object, or if the child 
immediately touched a toy that had fallen and been replaced on the tray, 4) if the child 
102 
 
touched the same toy twice or more in succession (without a 10 s delay) or if the child 
simultaneously touched two objects from the same category, it was counted as a single 
touch, 5) if the child simultaneously touched two objects from different categories, it was 
not considered a touch and a break in the sequence was recorded, and 6) if the child 
focused on and touched a new object while still manipulating another object, a touch was 
recorded for the new object. The administration protocol for the sequential touching task 
used throughout this paper is provided in Appendix L.  
The sequence in which the objects were touched was noted. Procedures for 
analyzing sequential touching were consistent with those developed by Mandler et al. 
(1987). The first procedure determined whether children sequentially touched objects that 
belonged to the same category more frequently than would be expected by chance. The 
mean run length (MRL) of successive touches, as defined by a sequence of deliberate 
touches to exemplars from the same category preceding a ‘break’ in sequence as a result 
of touching an exemplar from a different category, was calculated for each child and then 
averaged for the group. According to Mandler et al. (1987), children who touch multiple 
objects from the same category in a sequence that is greater than expected by chance are 
considered to have selected objects into categories based on some level of similarity, a 
behaviour that is interpreted as being systematic and category-driven (Oakes & Rakison, 
2003). For a task that includes two categories of four objects each, chance value is 1.75 
(Mandler et al. 1991). The coding protocol for the sequential touching task used 




Although MRL analyses are informative when it comes to categorical abilities of 
groups of individuals, this type of analysis tells us little about an individual child’s 
knowledge of categories, nor of the type of touching that took place. Therefore, an 
additional approach for analyzing children’s sequential touching was employed in order 
to ascertain whether a child’s touches were aimed more towards one category than 
another, or equally to both categories. As outlined by Dixon, Price, Watkins and Brink 
(2007), children’s sequential touching was coded for ‘special’ runs, which consist of 
touching a minimum of three different objects from the same category (either animate or 
inanimate) in succession. Based on these special runs, each participant was then 
identified as a noncategorizer, a single categorizer, or an exhaustive categorizer. 
Noncategorizers refer to participants with no special runs in either category. Single 
categorizers refer to participants with at least one special run in only one category 
(animate or inanimate). Finally, exhaustive categorizers refer to participants with at least 
one special run in both categories (animate and inanimate). The entire sequences of 
touches containing the special runs were then entered into a Monte Carlo program, 
TouchStat 3.0 (Dixon & Watkins, 2004), to determine if they were likely to have 
occurred by chance. The program then simulated 10,000 random touch sequences in 
order to determine the frequency of occurrence of these special runs. Based on Mandler 
et al. (1987), a probability lower than .10 (p <.10) signified that the participant’s run was 
unlikely to be due to chance alone. Based on the probability results, we determined 
whether each participant still qualified for their single categorizer or exhaustive 
categorizer status. More specifically, if the resulting probability value was found to be 
above .10, the child was then moved to the non-categorizer category, whereas if the 
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resulting probability value was found to be below .10, the child remained in the single or 
exhaustive category. The percentage of participants in each category was then calculated.  
Inter-coder Agreement  
A second coder naïve to the experimental hypothesis independently coded 25% of 
the infants (at least one infant from each testing array). Interrater reliability was obtained 
by calculating a percentage of agreement for the order in which the items were touched. 
Average agreement was determined to be 88%.  
Results and Discussion  
Run length analysis  
One-sample t-tests were used to compare infant MRLs to the MRL expected by 
chance (1.75). Preliminary analyses revealed no significant gender differences in MRL, 
and therefore all analyses were collapsed across gender. The infants had an average MRL 
(M = 2.02, SD = .73) that was significantly greater than chance, t(30) = 2.07, p = .047, d 
= .76. This suggests that at least by 18 months of age, typically developing infants have 
an understanding of the broad A-I distinction.  
Monte Carlo analysis  
With the use of a Monte Carlo program, children’s categorization of ‘special’ runs 
(a minimum of three different objects touched from the same category in succession) was 
compared to chance. A total of 51.6% of the children were identified as noncategorizers, 
32.3% as single categorizers, and 16.1% as exhaustive categorizers.   
This study addressed the question of conceptual categorization at the broadest 
level – that of animate and inanimate domains – in 18-month-old infants. Previous 
research using the sequential touching task has shown that by 18 months 73% of infants 
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are capable of forming categories at the global level (e.g., animal and vehicle) while only 
30% succeed at doing so at the basic level (e.g. dogs and horses) (Mandler et al. 1991). 
The current study was the first to determine that by this age, 48% of infants can also form 
categories at a higher level of inclusiveness. While the lower percentage of children who 
are able to form domain level categories at this age suggests that this may be a more 
conceptually demanding task, our finding does confirms the developmental trajectory 
proposed by Mandler (2003) whereby children first acquire broad categories, and learn to 
distinguish among the narrower, lower-level categories as their age increases. The 
discovery of successful domain-general categorization at 18 months in typically 
developing infants prompted us to examine this level of categorical knowledge in a 
population of children with developmental difficulties in the social domain. By 
comparing domain-level categorization with an older group of autistic children, we 
addressed whether children with ASD form object categories in the same way as 
normally developing children.  
Experiment 2  
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine young autistic children’s ability to form 
an A-I distinction. In addition to the domain-level categorization administered in 
Experiment 1, global and basic levels of categorization were also administered in order to 
assess the progression of category acquisition among children with ASD.  
Method  
Participants  
Sixteen 41-month-old children (M age = 41.39 months, SD = 9.82, range = 25.49 
to 54.00 months) participated in Experiment 2. The participants were all children 
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diagnosed with autism who were taking part in a large-scale longitudinal study looking at 
the developmental trajectories in children with ASD and the factors associated with 
optimal outcome. At the time of testing, the large-scale study was still ongoing at a 
hospital in Montréal, Québec. Prior to beginning an intensive data collection procedure, 
all participants were diagnosed with ASD by clinical opinion, the ADI-R, and the ADOS, 
and had a non-verbal mental age of 18 months (the minimum needed to do the ADI-R). 
There were three girls and 13 boys, all from the greater Montréal area.  
Materials and Procedure  
The stimuli consisted of objects belonging to either the animate or inanimate 
domain. The stimuli used to test children’s understanding of the animate domain 
consisted of eight different people figurines (Caucasian woman, Caucasian man, 
Caucasian girl, Caucasian boy, African-American woman, African-American man, 
African-American girl, African-American boy) and eight replicas of animals (cow, dog, 
dolphin, eagle, horse, pig, rabbit, elephant). Children’s understanding of the inanimate 
domain was examined with the use of eight vehicles (car, boat, airplane, truck, bike, van, 
canoe, and helicopter) and eight pieces of furniture (desk, chair, bed, bath, lamp, table, 
sofa, and dresser). Children’s ability to make global-level and basic-level distinctions was 
also examined. For the global-level trial, children were presented contrasts such as 
animals vs. vehicles, animals vs. furniture, people vs. vehicles, or people vs. furniture. 
For the basic-level trials, children were presented with contrasts such as dogs vs. cats, 
tables vs. chairs, or planes vs. cars. For any given trial, four objects from each of the two 
categories tested were presented to the child on a red tray measuring 44.80 x 34.60 cm. A 
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handheld stopwatch was used to time each trial. The testing session was recorded through 
a video camera on a VHS cassette.  
Testing took place in a room with a one-way mirror at a hospital in Montréal. The 
sequential touching task was administered prior to another research-related study 
administered by hospital staff. Each child sat on a chair across a small table from the 
experimenter. The parent sat behind the child and was asked not to influence the child’s 
behaviour by commenting in any way or by calling attention to any of the toys during the 
study. In the case where a child left his or her seat, the parent was to simply assist the 
child back to the table without intervening in the study. The experimenter presented the 
child with four items from each category in a random fashion on a red tray. The tray was 
positioned in front of the child, within his or her reach. The experimenter encouraged the 
child to play with the objects on the tray by motioning broadly to the entire set of objects 
while saying “Look at these…. These are for you to play with.” The children were 
allotted two minutes and 30 seconds to manipulate and play with the objects freely, with 
no feedback about their touching behaviour. If a child turned around to look at his or her 
parents, the experimenter attempted to redirect the child’s attention to the tray of objects 
by saying “CHILD’S NAME, Look at the toys!” In the case where a child ignored certain 
objects (i.e., did not touch the objects at all), the experimenter highlighted the objects by 
waving her hand in a circular manner above the objects (without pointing at any specific 
toy) and said “CHILD’S NAME, Look at these!”  If the child dropped an object or an 
object was out of his or her reach, the experimenter unobtrusively placed the object on 
the tray within the child’s reach.  
108 
 
Each testing session included three trials. In the first, domain-level trial, children 
were presented with a collection of four objects from the animate category (e.g., two 
people and two animals) and four objects from the inanimate category (e.g., two vehicles 
and two pieces of furniture) and their pattern of touching was observed. In the second 
trial, the children were presented with a different set of eight objects in order to assess 
their global-level understanding of the A-I distinction. For instance, children were 
presented with contrasts as diverse as animals vs. vehicles, animals vs. furniture, people 
vs. vehicles, or people vs. furniture. The different global-level contrasts were randomly 
assigned across subjects. In the third trial, children’s basic-level categorization 
knowledge was examined by assessing whether children attend to basic-level distinctions 
such as dogs vs. cats, tables vs. chairs, or cars vs. planes. The presentation of trials (i.e., 
domain-, global-, and basic-level) as well as the types of contrasts presented for the 
global- and basic-level trials were counterbalanced across subjects.  
Coding and Scoring  
The coding scheme for recording children’s sequential-touching behavior was 
identical to that of Experiment 1. As well, the procedures for analyzing sequential 
touching were the same as those of Experiment 1, with the addition that an overall MRL 
was calculated for each category level (domain, global, basic).  
Inter-coder Agreement  
The primary researcher coded all the data. A second, independent coder, then 
coded a random selection of 29% of the children (N =5). A percentage agreement 
between the different objects touched was obtained. Overall percentage reliability for 
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objects touched by the children was 93% for the domain-level trials, 94% for the global-
level trials, and 88% for the basic-level trials.    
Results and Discussion  
Run length analysis  
In the first analysis, the MRL for each category level (domain, global, basic) was 
compared to the MRL expected by chance (1.75) in order to determine whether children 
were responding in a way that was significantly different from that expected by chance. 
Two participants were eliminated from all analyses due to their performance on the basic 
trial. More specifically, these participants played exclusively with the cars and ignored 
the planes altogether on the cars vs. planes trial, resulting in a car bias. Since these two 
participants’ domain- and global-level trials consisted of contrasts which included 
vehicles, we opted to exclude them from all subsequent analyses. One-tailed t-tests (test 
value = 1.75) for the domain and basic levels were not statistically greater than expected 
by chance (domain: t(13) = .86, p = .21, d = .48; basic: t(13) = .47, p = .32, d = .26), 
whereas the result for the global level was significant (t(13) = 2.73, p = .01, d = 1.51), 
indicating that the children exhibited some systematic behavior when touching items that 
belonged to global categories of animals or people versus furniture or vehicles. These 
MRL results provide preliminary evidence that autistic children can categorize at a more 
global level. The MRLs for each category level, and their respective t-tests (one-tailed) 




Table 6  
Mean Run Lengths, Standard Deviations, and Associated t-Test Values in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2.  
 18-month-old typically developing  42-month-old autistic 
 M SD t(30)  M SD t(13 ) 
Domain  2.02* 0.73 2.07  1.66 .41 .86 
Global -- -- --  2.24* .66 2.73 
Basic -- -- --  1.68 .53 .47 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent degrees of freedom. 
* Indicates significantly above chance MRL (1.75), p < .05 (one-tailed) 
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Children’s categorization abilities were further examined with a repeated 
measures ANOVA comparing the three levels of categorization: domain, global, and 
basic. If children with ASD do indeed categorize efficiently when simple, perceptual cues 
are involved but have greater difficulty with more abstract concept formation, then we 
would expect them to form lower-level categories before higher-level ones, supporting 
other findings that children with ASD often focus on narrower parts of the environment. 
Results showed that there was a significant effect of categorization level on children’s 
sequential touching as measured by their MRL, F (2, 26) = 4.45, p=.02, n
2
p = .26. 
Pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni corrections) revealed that children had a 
statistically higher MRL on the global trial (M = 2.24, SD = .66) than on the domain trial 
(M =1.66, SD =.41), p = .03. As well, there was a statistical trend favoring the hypothesis 
that global categories (M = 2.24, SD = .66) actually develop before basic-level ones (M 
= 1.68, SD = .53), p = .13. Overall, the run length analyses seem to suggest that these 
children with ASD, as a group, were sequentially touching objects from the same 
category in a systematic fashion when presented with global categories of animals or 
people versus furniture or vehicles, but were less able to do so when more abstract 
categories were involved. 
Monte Carlo analysis  
Monte Carlo simulations (cutoff value of p <.10, see page 95 for details) on the 
domain level trial revealed that 71.4% of the children were identified as noncategorizers, 
14.3% as single categorizers, and 14.3% as exhaustive categorizers. On the global level 
trials, 21.4% of the children were identified as noncategorizers, 50.0% were identified as 
single categorizers, and 28.6% as exhaustive categorizers.  
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Comparative analyses  
Knowledge of typically developing children’s categorization abilities can often be 
informative when examining differences in populations of children who experience 
developmental difficulties. As such, we were interested in whether children with ASD 
categorize differently from typically developing children.  
First, one-sample t-tests were used to compare the mean CA of the typically 
developing children to that of the ASD group. The ASD group were significantly older 
(M = 41.39 months, SD = 9.82) than the typically developing group (M = 18.61 months, 
SD = .65),  t(45) = 13.00, p <.000, d = 3.27. Although a measure of mental age was not 
obtained for the control group, the autistic sample had a minimum mental age of 18 
months (the minimum required for completion of the ADI-R), enabling us to derive 
comparisons between the two groups’ categorization knowledge. It is expected that the 
older ASD group would perform as well, if not better, than the typically developing 
group in the absence of any categorization deficits. However, if indeed individuals with 
ASD do not form social categories in the same way as normally developing children do, 
as has been suggested in the literature, then we would expect to see a difference when 
comparing the MRL of the ASD group to that of the typically developing children. We 
therefore compared the typically developing 18-month-old children’s performance on the 
domain level to that of the autistic children. An independent sample t-test conducted on 
the A-I MRL of the domain trial reached marginal significance, t(43) = 1.75, p = .09, d  = 
.61, indicating a difference in the categorization abilities of these two groups. Consistent 
with the run length analyses, it appears that the typically developing children were able to 
categorize at the domain level, whereas the ASD group had greater difficulty doing so.     
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General Discussion  
Despite the enormous strides that have been made in the past two decades in 
understanding the nature of the deficits in autism, there remain many unanswered 
questions about the development of autism in infancy and early childhood. Specifically, 
although autism appears to have a distinct presentation by the age of three, the literature 
suggests that it is surprisingly difficult to detect at an earlier age. Therefore, there is a 
paramount need for tasks that tap into the deficits evident early on. Given that the A-I 
distinction is a significant milestone in early typical cognitive development, it seemed 
important to determine whether this accomplishment was also present in the case of 
autism. Ultimately, if a deficit exists in the ability to form an A-I distinction among 
children with ASD, then potential tasks that assess the ability to form conceptual 
categories of animates and inanimates might be beneficial in the early detection of 
autism.    
The study of categorization at a domain level (e.g., animates vs. inanimate 
objects) allows us to explore the developmental precursors of the essential distinction 
between living and non-living beings that develop during the preschool period. The 
animate and inanimate domain-general categories we tested here have hardly been 
explored scientifically, despite researchers arguing that the A-I distinction is acquired 
relatively early in infancy (Rakison, 2003; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Previous 
research using a sequential touching task has found that infants from 12 to 30 months of 
age will sequentially touch items from the same basic- and global-level categories, with 
the primacy of the global level at 16 months, followed by the basic level at 24-30 months 
(e.g., Mandler & Bauer, 1988; Mandler et al., 1991; Oakes et al., 1996). This 
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developmental pattern was replicated in our sample of 18-month-old infants. More 
importantly, the 18-month-olds in the current study also sequentially touched items from 
the same domain-general categories of animates and inanimates. Domain-general 
categorization is the ability to classify objects as animate (e.g., person, animal) or 
inanimate (e.g., vehicle, furniture) at the highest level of inclusivity, making the present 
set of studies the first to examine a level of categorization above the global level. 
Previous research examining such abilities in a more indirect way has indicated that 
infants have developed a concept of animates by 16 months of age (Poulin-Dubois et al., 
2006). Such findings suggest that at this developmental stage, infants understand that 
objects within the animate domain share common features and reveal the existence of 
conceptual knowledge in infancy. The results from Experiment 1 supplement such 
findings by demonstrating that by the middle of the second year of life, infants are also 
capable of distinguishing domain-general categories.  
The extent to which the acquisition of categorization abilities in typical 
development is applicable to populations of children who experience developmental 
difficulties is vitally important knowledge. As such, the current paper also aimed to shed 
light on autistic children’s ability to form an A-I distinction so as to further our 
knowledge of autistic children’s categorization abilities, and to decipher to what extent 
their ability to group categories together differs from typical development. The sequential 
touching task was deemed most appropriate as the method with which to test autistic 
children’s category knowledge given its unstructured format and emphasis on 
spontaneous touching behaviors, and not on imitative abilities. Based on sequential 
touching run lengths, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that children with ASD between 
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the ages of two to four and a half years differed from the typically developing group in 
the ability to categorize at the domain level. The ASD children were capable however of 
categorizing at a global level, indicating that children with ASD are indeed capable of 
forming conceptual categories, though not at the highest level of inclusiveness. That the 
ASD group was able to categorize at the global level lends credence to the notion that the 
detection of biological features is not completely impaired in individuals with ASD, as 
indicated by their ability to differentiate animate categories from inanimate ones. This is 
consistent with Rutherford et al.’s (2006) assertion that the mechanisms responsible for 
the perception of animacy are functional in autism. The more abstract level of conceptual 
knowledge of the broad animate domain has not yet been achieved however. 
Nonetheless, it does appear from the current findings that the autistic group’s category 
acquisition follows the same development progression as that of typically developing 
children, as evidenced by the fact that they were able to master more inclusive levels 
first. That is, the autistic children’s average run length was longer at the global level than 
at the basic level, consistent with research indicating that global categorization is 
acquired prior to basic-level categorization (e.g. Mandler & Bauer, 1988; Mandler & 
McDonough, 1993; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1995; Rostad, Poulin-Dubois, & Yott, 2009).  
In considering these results, it is important to note that the current study did not 
control for MA, making it difficult to draw explicit comparisons between the cognitive 
development of the ASD group and that of the typically developing group. To afford 
more precision in the comparisons between the groups of children tested, these findings 
should be replicated in a similar design but with restrictions on CA and MA. In a study 
by Gopnik & Meltzoff (1992), infants who formed categories had a greater likelihood of 
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producing more object names. In light of such research showing a link between 
categorization and naming, also placing restrictions on the participants’ language ability 
can only further our ability to speak of the impact of categorization abilities in autism on 
other skills such as language development. In addition, testing typically developing 
children on the same global and basic levels of categorization as those administered to 
our ASD group would allow for more conclusive inferences about a common 
developmental progression in categorization among the two groups.  
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that the benefits of early intervention in 
ASD are unquestionable and underscore the need for effective early identification. 
Despite these findings, the average age for diagnosis is still three to four years (Filipek et 
al., 1999). This delay in diagnosis is even more surprising given research showing that 
parents often recall noticing developmental delays or deficits in their child between 12 
and 19 months of age (De Giacomo & Fombonne, 1998), and that abnormalities in social 
communicative behaviour often manifest themselves before 20 months of age (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1996; Cox et al., 1999). As such, replicating this study with a group of 
children between the ages of 18 months and three years at risk for autism would allow for 
the use of information about their ability to form conceptual categories of animates and 
inanimates in the early detection of autism. Should it be further established that children 
with ASD are indeed delayed in their ability to form various levels of conceptual 
categories, then tasks that assess their ability to form conceptual categories of animates 
and inanimates might be beneficial in the early detection of autism.    
Future research in this area is sorely needed, especially in light of evidence that 
autistic children who benefit from early intervention during preschool years show 
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significant improvements in a number of different areas including language (Bondy & 
Frost, 1995; Harris, Handleman, Gordon, Kristoff, & Fuentes, 1991), communication 
skills (Koegel, 2000), imitative skills (Ozonoff & Cathcart, 1998), IQ (Lovaas, 1987; 
McEachin, Smith, & Lovaas, 1993), and disruptive behaviours (Scattone, Wilczynski, 
Edwards, & Rabian, 2002). For a review of research on the early detection and 
intervention in children with autism, see Bryson, Rogers, and Fombonne (2003).  
Despite the limitations of our study, our findings that autistic children of 
preschool age can categorize at the global but not the domain level will hopefully inspire 
future research seeking to resolve some of the mystery surrounding the social information 
processing impairment in ASD. An understanding of autistic children’s ability to form an 
A-I distinction will further our knowledge of autistic children’s categorization abilities, 





Chapter 4: Conclusion  
Over the past two decades, research on children's conceptual development has 
focused a great deal on children's understanding of psychological and biological 
phenomena. Theory of mind (ToM) ability, for instance, has been studied extensively as a 
core domain of children's social understanding and is often discussed as a significant 
developmental achievement that has its roots in early infancy. Research in developmental 
psychology has also focused on what children know about other core domains of thought, 
including that of the natural world, such as biology and physics. Increasingly, studies on 
children's knowledge of the mind and the world that surrounds them have begun to 
address the question of what children understand about these domains and at what point 
they begin to develop that understanding. Indeed, contemporary discussions of children's 
core domains of thought such as naïve psychology and naïve biology have begun to 
promote the idea that continuity exists between certain early infant abilities and later 
preschool accomplishments in these realms. Surprisingly however, very few empirical 
studies have examined children's thinking across both naïve psychology and naïve 
biology. The current dissertation endeavors to resolve this omission in the literature. As 
such, one main objective of this dissertation was to further examine the roots of children's 
knowledge about naïve psychology and naïve biology in early infancy as well as to 
explore the extent of children's understanding across these two core conceptual domains 
of thought. Another focus was the exploration of a relationship between a potential 
precursor of naïve biology in infancy and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), a disorder 
characterized by a social information processing deficit that may well be related to the 
processing of biological motion. 
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Summary of Findings 
The goal of the first paper (Frenkiel-Fishman & Poulin-Dubois, submitted) was 
threefold. One goal was to examine whether continuity exists between typically 
developing infants' early understanding of the biological differences between animates 
and animates (A-I) and their more developed knowledge of ToM during the preschool 
years. A second goal was to examine whether continuity exists between this early 
understanding of the A-I distinction in infancy and a later more developed form of naïve 
biology. Lastly, the concurrent relationship between naïve psychology and naïve biology 
during the preschool years was examined. Two longitudinal studies were conducted in 
order to address these important questions. In the first longitudinal study, infants 
participated in a generalized imitation task at 16 or 20 months of age which assessed their 
ability to generalize target properties to the animate (e.g. animals) and inanimate (e.g. 
vehicles) domain. The participants then returned to the laboratory at 64 months of age 
and were administered a battery of five ToM tasks as well as an animacy acceptability 
task. In the second longitudinal study, a slightly modified generalized imitation task was 
administered to infants aged 16 or 20 months which assessed their ability to generalize 
psychological properties to the appropriate animate domain (e.g. people versus animals). 
At 72 months of age, these participants then returned to the laboratory to complete a 
battery of ToM tasks as well as an animacy task designed to measure their understanding 
of the essential properties between living and non-living kinds. 
Interestingly, an association was found in Experiment 1 between the ability to 
categorize objects into animate and inanimate domains in infancy and later ToM 
knowledge at preschool age. In particular, infants' understanding that animals are more 
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appropriate than vehicles for the purpose of enacting motion and sensory activities was 
related to their later knowledge of false-belief (considered the cornerstone of ToM) at 
preschool age. As well, the hypothesis that naïve biology may have its roots in an earlier 
understanding of the differences between animates and inanimates was also supported by 
the finding that infants' conceptual knowledge of animates and inanimates in infancy was 
linked to later knowledge of the concept of animacy at preschool age, providing much 
needed insight into the roots of naïve biology in infancy. Another noteworthy result was 
the presence of a concurrent relationship between preschoolers' understanding of animacy 
and sentiency and their knowledge of ToM. It would appear that children's reasoning 
about psychological phenomena, particularly mental states such as desires and beliefs, is 
linked to their understanding of animacy and sentiency during the preschool years. This 
finding expands upon the notion that children's biological framework may not be 
completely distinct from their psychological framework at preschool age, but rather the 
two may be linked by the understanding of people as causal and purposeful agents.  
Unexpectedly, the findings of Experiment 1 were not replicated in Experiment 
2. It is important to note, however, that infants' understanding of the A-I distinction was 
not assessed in this second study. Rather, infant's ability to generalize motion and sensory 
properties across a broad animate domain (i.e., to animals and people) was evaluated. 
Contrary to initial expectations, this early conceptual knowledge of the animate domain 
was not longitudinally associated with either ToM or knowledge of animacy at preschool 
age. It is also quite surprising that infants' preference for the person over the animal to 
imitate sensory events as an early measure of ToM ability was not linked to later ToM 
knowledge. As well, the modest concurrent correlations between ToM and knowledge of 
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living and non-living kinds contributes to the possibility that the infancy and the 
preschool tasks employed in this study were likely tapping into different abilities such 
that continuity between these two time points was obscured. Despite the limited findings 
of Experiment 2, the overall findings of this paper contribute significantly to the literature 
on infants' early cognitive development. Specifically, this paper provides preliminary 
evidence that a) the A-I distinction in infancy may be a precursor ability to later 
knowledge of both ToM and naïve biology and b) children's biological knowledge system 
is related to their psychological one.  
In the second paper (Frenkiel-Fishman, Poulin-Dubois, Rostad & Fombonne, 
submitted), the interface between naïve psychology and naïve biology was further 
explored by testing a population of autistic children. The demonstrated finding reported 
in the first paper of this thesis of a relationship between naïve psychology and naïve 
biology in typically developing children begs the question of whether a similar 
relationship between the two naïve theories is present in autistic children as well. 
Research demonstrating deficits in ToM reasoning in autistic individuals abound (e.g.,  
Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994; Happé 1995; Leslie & Frith 1988; Perner et al. 1989; 
Yirmiya et al., 1998). What remains unknown, in light of the evidence presented thus far 
of a link between naïve psychology and biology, is whether autistic children might also 
demonstrate a deficit in naïve biology. Evidence of a deficit in the realm of naïve biology 
in addition to that of naïve psychology among autistic individuals would theoretically 
support the proposed notion that the ability to perceive social information is related to the 
processing of biological motion. Therefore, the goal of the second paper was to examine 
whether young autistic children are impaired in their ability to form an A-I distinction. A 
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sequential touching task was administered to a group of young typically developing 
children (Experiment 1) and autistic children (Experiment 2). The results showed that 18-
month-old typically developing children successfully categorized at the domain level, as 
evidenced by their sequential touching of items from the same animate and inanimate 
categories. In contrast, the autistic children were impaired in their ability to categorize at 
the domain-level, though they did successfully categorize at the global-level. Overall, 
these data suggest that while the autistic children did not demonstrate knowledge of the 
broad animate domain, representative of categorization at the highest level of 
inclusiveness, their ability to form global categories can be interpreted as indicative of an 
ability to detect biological features in order to differentiate animate from inanimate 
categories. Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggests that autistic children's conceptual 
category acquisition follows the same developmental pattern as that of typically 
developing children, specifically that of a global-to-basic level categorization. 
Contributions to the literature 
           Taken as a whole, the current dissertation helped further identify the 
developmental trend of children's knowledge of both naïve psychology and naïve 
biology, and shed light on the social information processing impairment in ASD by 
examining autistic children's acquisition of various levels of conceptual categories. The 
first paper represents an important contribution to the scientific research on children's 
developmental understanding of the mind. Until recently, the work on children's 
knowledge of mental states has tended to focus almost exclusively on the changes that 
occur between three and four years of age, with a great deal less consideration given to 
the early precursors of ToM in infancy. However, more recent investigations suggest that 
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the extent of infants' and toddlers' knowledge has largely been underestimated and have 
provided evidence of early understanding of mental states in preverbal infants. The 
findings from our longitudinal studies have added to this emerging field by strengthening 
the notion that infants possess some rudimentary understanding of mental state reasoning 
much earlier than has traditionally been expected. We have successfully demonstrated 
that between 18 and 20 months of age infants are already aware that animals and not 
vehicles play the role of agents in motion and sensory events and that this awareness is 
related to their later understanding of false-belief at preschool age. This finding has 
certainly strengthened and extended the hypothesis that there is continuity in the 
development of naïve theories (Charman et al., 2000; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005, 
2007) by establishing a link between the early understanding of biological differences 
between animate and inanimates in infancy and later knowledge of false belief. 
Beyond this, the originality of this work is in its demonstration of an 
interdependence of knowledge, both longitudinally and concurrently, between naïve 
biology (i.e. animacy knowledge) and naïve psychology (false-belief understanding). To 
date, there is a considerable dearth of studies that have addressed the interface between 
these two different domains of thought. Our findings support the proposed relation 
between animacy and later ToM and are the first of their kind to demonstrate a link 
between these two types of naïve theories. Comparative studies across these domains, 
such as those of this dissertation, contradict the long-standing assumption among some 
researchers that psychological and biological cognitive domains function independently 
of one another (e.g. Inagaki & Hatano, 1993). Previous research has often treated the 
presence of knowledge of the mind as independent of knowledge of the natural world 
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(Binnie & Williams, 2002; Coley, 1995; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Of course, one of 
the difficulties in opposing this position has been methodological in nature, with the 
challenge of devising tasks that assess equivalent levels of understanding across both 
domains. Our use of age-appropriate tasks that measure animacy as well as ToM in both 
infancy and preschool age is an added strength of the current thesis that further enables us 
to substantiate the proposed claim that psychological and biological reasoning are 
intertwined.  
The current studies also expand upon existing knowledge of theories of ToM 
development in childhood. A central focus of research within the field of ToM concerns 
whether ToM is best conceptualized as a single unitary construct or, rather, one which 
differentiates into separate abilities. Consequently, a number of different theories have 
been put forth to account for the nature and development of ToM. One theory contends 
that an innate module for ToM exists. This ‘Theory of Mind Module’ hypothesis assumes 
that ToM derives from a specific module which instantaneously processes information 
about attended actions, considers those actions to be intentional, and thus automatically 
generates the relevant mental states for those actions. According to this modularity 
account, conceptual change does not take place during the infancy to preschool years. 
Rather, ToM develops as a result of the maturing process of the module itself (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Evidence in 
support of this modularity hypothesis for ToM development is taken from the case of 
Autism. Seeing as people with autism are specifically impaired in their understanding of 
persons as psychological beings and that a ToM deficiency seems to be unique to autism, 
the assumption is that a biological, brain basis for ToM by way of a module must exist.  
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An alternative account to the modularity hypothesis posits that the nature and 
development of ToM is best understood as an everyday, naïve theory of the mind and of 
people as psychological beings. In this sense, ToM development proceeds by way of the 
creation, modification, and ultimately the replacement of preceding theories of the mind 
with more consistent ones which children have formulated as a result of evidence 
acquired through their interactions and experiences with people. This sequence of 
reformulation and subsequent replacement of theories is thought to be the result of 
general inferential mechanisms, and not a single unitary construct as the modularity 
account contends. Recent research has even provided evidence of a consistent 
developmental pattern in children’s understanding of the mind, notably in false-belief 
performance, across various countries and task manipulations (Callaghan et. al., 2005; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Furthermore, rather than being accounted for by an 
innate module which undergoes a maturation process, this “Theory Theory” account 
views the development of ToM as the result of conceptual changes in children’s 
understanding of the mind which occur during the fundamental developmental years 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Wellman, 1992; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Indeed, a 
multitude of studies have corroborated this approach as a means of explaining children’s 
developing understanding of the social (Gopnik, 1993; Wellman, 1992), physical (Smith, 
Carey, and Wiser, 1985) and biological world (Carey, 1985; Gelman & Wellman, 1991).   
The results of the current thesis are in favor of this theory theory hypothesis as 
well. Based on this naïve theories approach of how children view the world, 
developmental continuity in children’s understanding of psychological and biological 
phenomena between the infancy and preschool years would be expected. Our finding that 
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the A-I distinction in infancy was related to later knowledge of false-belief at preschool 
age supports the notion that children’s interactions with people and explorations of the 
world around them contribute to their development of ToM. Our observed developmental 
continuity between infants' knowledge of animates and inanimates in infancy and later 
knowledge of the concept of animacy at preschool age further substantiates the theory 
theory account of ToM development.  
Future Directions 
No doubt, a number of limitations of the current thesis should be taken into 
consideration. The sample size in both of our longitudinal studies was relatively small. 
While it is well known that longitudinal studies inherently have a higher attrition rate 
than non-longitudinal ones, these small sample sizes may have inevitably obscured the 
relationship between a potential precursor (i.e. knowledge of animacy) and later abilities. 
Future studies should endeavor to assess a larger sample of participants at infancy so that 
sufficient statistical power remains to allow for the detection of a developmental 
trajectory, despite the attrition rate. That said, while the results of the second longitudinal 
study were less conclusive than the first longitudinal study, it is important to keep in 
mind that taken together, the results of both studies indicate that knowledge of animacy 
in young children may be linked to ToM ability at preschool age. This relevant finding 
ought to be replicated with a larger sample size in order to further identify the trajectories 
involved in children’s ToM development. 
Future research should also assess the ability to infer a wider range of 
psychological attributes to people in infancy (beyond looking into a mirror and answering 
a telephone) as a measure of infants’ early ability to infer psychological properties 
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exclusively to people. Perhaps then, more conclusive evidence can be found of a 
developmental continuity between infants’ rudimentary understanding of the mind and 
later, more developed, ToM knowledge. While there is mounting evidence to support the 
notion that ToM gradually develops through a series of steps and that continuity exists 
between infants’ elementary understanding of the human mind and later ToM ability 
(Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Chow, 2009; Sodian, in press), subsequent research that 
systematically follows children’s increasing knowledge of animacy and sentiency from 
infancy to the preschool years would certainly strengthen the continuity hypothesis.  
Another important avenue for future research is to further explore the roots of 
naïve biology in infancy. Inquiries into the origins of naïve biology are in stark contrast 
to what is happening in the field of naïve psychology where a growing number of 
research efforts are being devoted to studying children’s early knowledge of the mind. 
While the A-I distinction in infancy was linked to later knowledge of animacy at 
preschool age in Experiment 1 of our first study, we failed to find a similar relationship 
between infants’ ability to generalize motion properties across a broad animate domain 
and a more developed understanding of living and non-living kinds at preschool age in 
Experiment 2. It may be that the task employed in Experiment 2 did not properly assess 
preschooler’s biological understanding such that continuity between early knowledge of 
animacy and later naïve biology could be detected. It would be interesting to explore 
whether other measures of preschooler’s knowledge of conceptual categories of living 
and non-living kinds are linked to an earlier knowledge of the A-I distinction. Perhaps 
tasks that assess preschoolers’ understanding that animals and artifacts have different 
internal parts (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Simons & Keil, 1995) or tasks that assess 
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whether preschoolers recognize that animate beings, in contrast to artifacts, grow larger 
over time (Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991) may be better measures of 
children’s biological understanding.  
Similarly, new tasks need to be devised to test biological understanding in 
infancy.  An understanding of the biology of different species entails an understanding of 
differing properties of those species. Motion is critical in the early understanding of the 
differences between animate and inanimate objects. As such, tasks designed to measure 
infants’ understanding of unique properties specific to animate objects (such as motion) 
are needed. One idea may be to examine whether infants understand that different motion 
properties are specific to different types of objects (animate versus inanimate) in the 
world. A generalized imitation task in which both animate motion (self-propelled motion) 
and inanimate motion (i.e. causal motion) were assessed may provide a better measure of  
the A-I distinction in infancy. Alternatively, a violation of expectancy task, a common 
experimental paradigm used in tests of naïve psychology, could be employed. This task 
requires the child to anticipate the behaviour of a person with a false belief. Studies using 
this particular methodology have shown that very young infants are aware of a 
character’s false belief as evidenced by their increased looking time at a particular scene 
that is incongruent with the character’s beliefs than at a scene that matches the character’s 
beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). This experimental 
procedure can be adapted to measure infants’ understanding that certain motion 
trajectories are incongruent with specific object types. An increase in the infant’s 
attention to an event that contravenes an expectancy of animate versus inanimate motion 
may be another way to assess biological understanding in infancy. While the extent to 
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which such a task measures a deep level of understanding is debatable in light of the fact 
that no active behavioral response is elicited (Poulin-et al., 2009), it may nonetheless 
provide an index of infants’ early appreciation that animate objects have different 
biological properties than inanimate objects. The use of these different infancy and 
preschool age tasks may enable continuity between early knowledge of animacy and later 
naïve biology to be better detected. The relationship between naïve biology and naïve 
psychology is an important one and the current dissertation represents an initial step in 
clarifying and outlining the progression of this relationship.  
Over the years, research has sought to determine whether specific cognitive 
deficits can account for the unique symptoms of autism. More specifically, a large focus 
has been placed on the hypothesis that a difficulty in the ability to recognize people as 
psychological beings, otherwise known as ToM, is specific to autism. Granted, a deficit 
in ToM is not the sole cognitive impairment in autism. In particular, current 
conceptualizations of the neuropsychological impairments in autism also include weak 
central coherence (Frith & Happé, 1994; Shah & Frith, 1983), executive system 
dysfunction (Hill, 2004; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) and medial temporal lobe deficits 
(Hetzler & Griffin, 1981). Notwithstanding the contributions of these other theories of the 
causes of autism, the ToM deficit hypothesis has greatly increased our understanding of 
the disorder and has highlighted the need for tasks that tap into autism-specific deficits 
early on. In light of the evidence we presented in our first paper that the A-I distinction in 
infancy may be a precursor to later ToM knowledge, the question of whether a 
relationship between naïve biology and naïve psychology exists in autism is especially 
relevant. As such, in our second paper, we sought to explore whether young autistic 
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children are capable of categorizing animate and inanimate objects at a domain-general 
level.  
The ToM hypothesis of autism has focused predominantly on deficits in the realm 
of mental state reasoning. However, the ability to interact in a social manner, including 
the ability to process emotional and perceptual information, starts long before ToM skills 
are evident in typically developing children (Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Seeing as A-I 
distinction is a significant milestone in early typical cognitive development, we were 
interested in determining whether this accomplishment is present in autism as well. The 
results of this study indicated that autistic children are indeed capable of categorizing at a 
global (e.g. animals vs. vehicles), albeit not at a domain (e.g. animates vs. inanimates) 
level. This finding is promising and suggests that the detection of biological features is 
not completely impaired in individuals with ASD. However, it is important to bear in 
mind that our task was a sequential touching one and did not explicitly assess the ability 
to use biological motion to form conceptual categories of animates and inanimates. If the 
ability to process motion properties indeed serves as a precursor to later social 
development as suggested by Rutherford, Pennington and Rogers (2006), then a task 
better suited to measure biological motion might be more appropriate for addressing 
autistic children’s knowledge of animacy. Further, if a deficit does indeed exist in the 
ability to form an A-I distinction among children with ASD, then potential tasks that 
assess the ability to form conceptual categories of animates and inanimates might be 
beneficial in the early detection of autism.  
One possibility may be to utilize a generalized imitation task as was done in the 
first paper of this dissertation. Autistic children’s ability to generalize target properties 
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after having seen the target actions being modeled might be a more meaningful measure 
of their animacy understanding than the sequence in which they touch objects. While 
controversy exists concerning the presence and extent of an imitation deficit in autism, 
this is in large part due to the range of experimental methodologies employed across 
studies of imitation in autism as well as differing operational definitions of imitation 
(Sevlever & Gillis, 2010). The advantage of using a generalized imitation task with 
autistic children is its use of specific prompting strategies, direct instruction, and 
modeling to elicit a response. Beadle-Brown & Whiten (2004), for instance, investigated 
whether autistic individuals showed a deficit in imitation ability using an elicited 
imitation task. The authors tested nine different categories of actions, including both 
symbolic actions (e.g., stirring an imaginary spoon in bowl) and non-symbolic actions 
with objects (e.g., building a brick tower). While the authors reported a trend showing 
that children with mild to moderate intellectual disability as well as typically developing 
children were better able to imitate symbolic actions with objects than were children with 
autism, this result was not statistically significant. Overall, the authors did not find a 
general or autism-specific imitation deficit when elicited imitation was employed. 
However, a number of limitations in this study, including small sample sizes and ceiling 
effects for some or all groups on the different actions performed, make it difficult to draw 
clear conclusions from this study. Nevertheless, the use of a generalized imitation task 
with autistic children might be advisable especially in light of intervention efforts 
showing that autistic children benefit from observational learning and typical instruction 
(Ledford, Gast, Luscre, & Ayres, 2008; Tekin-Iftar & Birkan, 2010). The use of a 
generalized imitation task may therefore not only better assess autistic children’s ability 
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to use biological motion to form an A-I distinction, but can potentially be adapted as a 
screening tool.  
Overall, the series of experiments in this thesis helped to clarify both the nature 
and development of precursors of ToM in infancy. Specifically, we successfully filled a 
gap in our current knowledge of precursors of both naïve psychology and naïve biology 
by revealing how the A-I distinction in infancy is related to later ToM and Animacy 
concepts. As well, this thesis contributed to our understanding of deficits in ASD and 
attempted to lay the groundwork for future explorations of tasks that can detect signs and 
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We would like to thank you for your past interest and participation in our research 
program a few years ago and we wish to invite you to return to our laboratory for another 
study on cognitive development.  As you may recall, your child participated in one of our 
research projects when they were approximately 16-months-old.  In this study, we were 
interested in examining whether infants understand that certain objects belong to the 
same group (e.g., cow and cat are both animals). To test whether infants had this ability, 
the experimenter modeled events which were exclusively done by people (e.g., answering 
a telephone) or done by both animals and people (e.g., moving up a set of stairs). We 
found that infants have a broad understanding of these categories by this young age. 
We are now eager to learn whether there is a link between infants’ imitative abilities and 
their later understanding (as preschoolers) of people’s behavior.  As such, we invite you 
to return to our laboratory with your child. Your child will be presented with a series of 
stories and asked to guess what a puppet knows or prefers on the basis of these stories. 
We will also be investigating whether children’s vocabulary is related to their behavior 
during these tasks.  To measure vocabulary, children will be asked to point to pictures 
that correspond to different words.    
 
Participation would involve one visit of approximately one hour to our research centre on 
the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West. 
Appointments can be scheduled at a time convenient to you, including weekends. Free 
parking is available on the campus for our participants, and we will gladly reimburse any 
transportation expenses at the time of your appointment. In addition, a report of these 
results will be mailed to you as soon as the study is completed. 
 
We would greatly appreciate your continued cooperation and interest in our research 
project. Research on children’s early cognitive development is only possible thanks to the 
contribution of time and effort by families like you!  If you would like further 
information about this study, have any questions about issues concerning cognitive 
development, or are willing to participate, please do not hesitate to contact Sarah 








______________________                  ______________________                
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.                   Sarah Frenkiel-Fishman, M.A.                            
Professor                                                 Ph.D. Candidate                                 

































Parental Consent Form 
 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being 
conducted by Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois and Sarah Frenkiel-Fishman of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine preschoolers’ 
understanding of other people’s desires and beliefs. 
 
B. PROCEDURES 
In this study, your child will be told five stories and asked to guess what a puppet knows or 
prefers on the basis of these stories. For example, your child will be shown a box of Smarties, 
asked what they think is inside, and then shown that the box actually contains crayons. Once 
the crayons are back in the box, your child will be asked to predict what a puppet thinks is 
inside the box. We will also measure your child’s vocabulary by using a standard vocabulary 
test, which involves pointing to pictures of different words. You will be able to watch your child 
at all times through a one-way mirror throughout the entire session. We will videotape your 
child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. That means that 
the researcher will not reveal your child’s identity in any written or oral reports about this study. 
Your child will be assigned a coded number, and that number will be used on all materials 
collected in this study. As well, because we are only interested in comparing children’s 
understanding as a function of age, no individual scores will be provided following participation.  
The entire session is expected to last approximately one hour. 
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a small gift and a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a 
thank-you for his/her participation.  
 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the 
confidentiality of your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this investigation that 
inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of Québec and Canada, if the 
researchers discover information that indicates the possibility of child maltreatment, or that your 
child is at risk for imminent harm, they are required to disclose this information to the 
appropriate agencies. If this concern emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, 
will discuss the reasons for this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to 
be taken.  
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any 
time without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any 
questions that might arise during the course of the research. 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know, 
but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual scores 




I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN 
THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to 
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at (514) 





_______________________   _______________________ 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.        Sarah Frenkiel-Fishman, M.A. 
Professor    Ph.D. Candidate  
Department of Psychology  Department of Psychology 






























Infant's first name: ______________________        Date of Birth: ______________________         
Infant’s last name: ______________________           Gender: ______________________          
Language(s) spoken at home: ______________________         
Mother's first name: ______________________        Father’s first name: ___________________ 
Mother’s maiden name: __________________          Father's last name: ___________________ 
Address: _____________________________           Telephone #: ___________________home 
    _____________________________           __________________________ work mom            
Postal Code: __________________________       __________________________ work dad 
e-mail: _______________________________ 
Mother's occupation: ______________________     Father's occupation: ___________________   
Mother’s education (highest level attained): ______________________          
Father’s education (highest level attained): ______________________            
Mother’s marital status: _______________                Father’s marital status: ________________         
 
Please answer the following general information questions about your child: 
Birth weight:    Length of pregnancy:  weeks 
Birth order:   (e.g., 1 = 1st child) 
Number of siblings:    
Were there any complications during the pregnancy?       
Has your child had any major medical problems?       




Participant#: _____________   Researcher: _____________ 
















Protocol for ToM Battery in Experiment 1 & 2 (Chapter 2) 
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TOM Scale: False Belief Tasks 
 
 
Experimenter: “I have something to show you. Look, look at this box.” 
 
The child is shown a smarties box and asked what he/she thinks the box contains.  
 
Experimenter: “What do you think is inside this box?” 
 
If the child responds with candies or smarties, then proceed to the next step 
 
If the child does not spontaneous respond in this way, the experimenter should prompt 
the child by pointing to the picture of smarties 
 Experimenter: “Look at these! Do you know what these are?” 
 
When the child responds, the experimenter should repeat the previous question: 
 
Experimenter: “What do you think is inside this box?” 
 
When the child responds correctly, the experimenter opens the box to reveal crayons 
inside. The experimenter acts surprised to learn the child is wrong 
 
Experimenter: “Let’s open it up and see what is in here” 
 
Experimenter: “Look! These are really crayons inside the box!: 
 
Then, the experimenter puts the crayons back inside the box and closes it up again. 
 
Experimenter: “Okay, what’s really inside the smarties box?” 
 
 
Experimenter: “What did you think was inside this box when I first showed it to 
you? Did you think there were crayons inside it or did you think there were 
Smarties inside it” (Self belief question) 
 





Experimenter: “Look! This is Jennifer/Peter, and he/she has never ever seen inside this 
smarties box. When I show this box to Jennifer/Peter, what will he/she think is inside, 
before he/she opens it? Smarties or crayons? (Other belief question) 
 
[These 2 test questions are scored as separate false belief tasks).  
 
Materials: 
Smarties Box, Crayons, Picture of story character 
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TOM Scale: Desire Task 
 
 
Experimenter: “I have something to show you” 
 
The child is shown a toy figure of a child and a sheet of paper with pictures of a carrot 
and a cookie on it. The child is then presented with a story in which the child story 
character’s favourite food is a carrot: 
 
Experimenter: “Here’s Melissa/Charlie. Melissa/Charlie’s favourite food is a carrot. It’s 
snack time now so Charlie wants a snack to eat.  
 
Experimenter: “Can you remember what Melissa/Charlie’s favourite food is?” (Memory 
control question) 
 
Experimenter: “It’s snack time now, which snack do you think Melissa/Charlie would 
want to eat? A carrot or a cookie?” (Test question) 
 
Experimenter: “Which is your favourite of these two foods: carrots or cookies?” 
(Control question) 
 
[Note: The forced choice option (carrots and cookies) should be counterbalanced 
across children.] 
 
Experimenter: “Which snack would you want to eat?” (Control question) 
 
**These control questions are included to ensure that the child is not simply 




Picture of carrot and cookie 
Picture of story character 
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TOM Scale: Emotion Task 
 
 
Experimenter: “I have something to show you”. 
 
The child is shown a girl/boy puppet and a sheet of paper with a picture of a pair of black 
socks on it.  
 
Experimenter: “Here’s Linda. It’s Linda’s birthday soon. Linda really wants a 
pair of black socks for her birthday. At her birthday party, Linda opened her 
birthday present and inside was a Barbie doll.  
 
Experimenter: “Here’s Matt. It’s Matt’s birthday soon. Matt really wants a pair 
of black socks for his birthday. At his birthday party, Matt opened his birthday 
present and inside was a toy racing car  
 
 
Experimenter: “What did Linda/Matt want for her/his birthday?” (Memory control 
question) 
 
Child is then presented with an illustration of the story character with a happy face and 
an illustration of the story character with a sad face and asked the test question: 
 
Experimenter: “How do you think Linda/Matt felt when s/he saw the [Barbie doll/toy 
racing car]? Would s/he be happy or sad? [Test question] 
 
[Note: the presentation of the forced choice options (happy and sad) should be 
counterbalanced across children] 
 
Experimenter: “Which would you want for your birthday? Black socks or a Barbie 
doll/toy racing car? [Control question #1] 
 
Experimenter: “How would you feel if you got a Barbie doll/toy racing car for your 
birthday? Would you feel happy or sad?” [Control question #2] 
 
**These control questions are included to ensure that the child is not simply 




Picture of Barbie/Socks or Car/Socks 
Picture of Character with neutral face 
Picture of story character with different emotions 
For a boy 
For a girl 
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Four Sweets Task 
 
MOTHER VERSION 
Experimenter: “I have something to show you”. 
 
The child is presented with four chocolate bar wrappers secured to a piece of card and 
asked: 
 
Experimenter: “Which chocolate bar do you like the most out of these four?” 
 
Experimenter: “Here’s Tammy/Mark. [POINT TO FACE] Tammy/Mark went shopping 
his her/his mother to buy groceries for dinner. Tammy/Mark was so well-behaved in the 
grocery store that his/her mother allowed her/him to choose a treat out of four different 
chocolate bars.”  
 
The child is then presented with a picture that has the story character’s face in the 
centre, with four chocolate bar wrappers secured in each corner. The story character is 
smiling and looking at one of the chocolate bars. The experimenter always selects 
versions of the picture in which the story character is looking at a chocolate bar that is 
different from the child’s previously stated preference.  
 




Experimenter: “Now, I know you said that ________ is your favourite chocolate bar, 
but can you tell me what your 2
nd
 favourite is?”. 
 
The child is presented with four chocolate bar wrappers secured to a piece of car and 
asked: 
 
Experimenter: “The next day, Tammy/Mark went shopping her/his grandmother to buy 
groceries for dinner. Tammy/Mark was so well-behaved in the grocery store that his/her 
grandmother allowed her/him to choose a treat out of four different chocolate bars.”  
 
Experimenter: “Can you tell me, looking at this picture, which chocolate bar 




Picture of 4 chocolate bars 
Picture of 4 chocolate bars with face gazing 
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ANIMACY-ACCEPTABILITY TASK - RANDOM ORDER #1 
 
4 PRACTICE QUESTIONS: 
1. The ballerina drank the dream 
2. The cow drove the car home. 
3. The teacher picked up the cloud. 
4. The giraffe played tennis.  
 
RANDOMIZED QUESTIONS: 
24. The chair knows that the snow is falling outside.   
13. The elephant wants all the peanuts from the zoo keeper.  
1. The woman knows that there is a car in the driveway. 
29. The pencil ate the piece of cake on the table. 
10. The dog knows where to hide its bone in the yard. 
11. The monkey wants to climb the trees in the zoo. 
26. The telephone slept on the table in the bedroom. 
20. The radio wants the clown to throw his ball.  
9. The rabbit knows that there are carrots in the kitchen. 
18. The tree wants the babysitter to fix the toy. 
12. The cat wants to catch the mouse under the table. 
23. The bicycle knows that there is a fish in the pond. 
31. The shoe ate the bread in the toaster. 
8. The father slept in the chair by the fireplace. 
30. The clock ate the fruit from the lunchbox. 
15. The horse slept on straw in the field. 
19. The ball wants the band to play some music. 
4. The man wants the policeman to find the money. 
28. The book slept on the shelf next to the movies.  
14. The tiger wants to run fast after the deer in the jungle.  
25. The eraser slept on the carpet under the couch. 
21. The flower knows that there is a penny on the ground. 
5. The girl ate chocolate chip cookies for desert. 
16. The bear slept under a tree in the woods. 
17. The tulip wants the lady to go shopping. 
2. The boy knows that the TV in his room was a gift. 
6. The mother ate breakfast before she woke up her children.  
27. The fridge slept in the kitchen next to the oven. 
7. The child slept in the bed next to her sister.  
3. The baby wants his mother to give him milk. 
   32. The schoolbag ate chocolate cake for desert.  



































THEORY OF MIND SCALE – CODING SHEET – ORDER A 
Participant #:    Date Coded: 
 










Order:  1    2    3    4   
 
 
False Belief Task  Circle Child’s Response 
 Correct 
Response 
What do you think is inside this box? (control question) Smarties Pens   





What did you think was inside this box when I first showed it 




When I show this box to __________ tonight, what will he/she 
think is inside, before he/she opens it? (other’s belief) (test 
question #2) 
Smarties  Pens 
 
 
The self & other’s belief questions are scored separately 




  Comments:    





Desire Task Circle Child’s Response 
 Correct 
Response 
Can you remember what Charlie’s favourite food is?” 




Which snack do you think Charlie would want to eat? Raw 
vegetables or lollipops?” (test question) 
carrot cookie  
 
Which is your favourite of these two foods: vegetables or 
lollipops?” (control question) 
carrot cookie  
 
Which snack would you want to eat?” (control question) carrot cookie   
Score (max = 1)   
     
  Comments:    







Emotion Task Circle Child’s Response 
 Correct 
Response 





How do you think Linda/Matt felt when s/he saw the [Barbie 





Which would you want for your birthday? Black socks or a 
Barbie doll/toy racing car? [control question #1] 
Black socks  
Barbie doll/ 
toy racing car  
 
 
How would you feel if you got a Barbie doll/toy racing car for 





Score  (max = 1)   
     
  Comments:    




Four Sweets Task  Child’s Response 
 Correct 
Response 
(mother version)          (chocolate target: ______________)   
Which chocolate bar do you like the most out of these four?    





(grandmother version) (chocolate target: ______________)   
Which chocolate bar do you like 2nd most out of these four?    




Score (max = 1)   
     
  Comments:    






Total TOM Scale Score 
     
  5 
 






















ANIMACY –ACCEPTABILITY TASK (ENGLISH) 
QUASI RANDOM ORDER #1  
 
 
Participant #:    Date Coded:  
Language: Sex:    M        F  Coded by:  
D.O.B:  
(mm/dd/yy) 
Age in  
Decimals 




Experimenter: “Let’s play a game. Here’s Jennifer (Puppet). Jennifer is going to say some 
sentences and I want you to tell me whether the sentence is OK or whether it’s Silly. OK? Let’s try 
a few.”  
 
(N.B.: A * indicates un-acceptable sentences – ask “why is it silly” for a total of 8 unacceptable 
sentences) 
 
 PRACTICE QUESTIONS   
A The ballerina drinks her dreams OK SILLY 
B The cow drives the car home  OK SILLY 
C The teacher picks up the cloud  OK SILLY 
D The giraffe plays tennis   OK SILLY 
  
TEST QUESTIONS 
    
*24 The chair knows that the snow is falling outside OK SILLY 
13  The elephant eats all the peanuts in the zoo OK SILLY 
1  The woman knows that there is a car in the driveway OK SILLY 
*29  The pencil eats the piece of cake on the table OK SILLY 
10  The dog knows where to hide its bone in the yard OK SILLY 
11  The monkey wants to climb the trees in the zoo OK SILLY 
*26  The telephone sleeps on the table in the bedroom OK SILLY 
*20  The radio wants the clown to throw his ball OK SILLY 
9  The rabbit knows that there are carrots in the kitchen OK SILLY 
*18  The tree wants the babysitter to fix the toy OK SILLY 
12  The cat wants to catch the mouse under the table OK SILLY 
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*23  The bicycle knows that there is a fish in the pond OK SILLY 
*31  The shoe eats the bread in the toaster OK SILLY 
8  The father slept in the chair by the fireplace OK SILLY 
*30  The clock eats the fruit from the lunchbox OK SILLY 
15  The horse sleeps on straw in the field OK SILLY 
*19  The ball wants the band to play some music OK SILLY 
4  The man wants the policeman to find the money OK SILLY 
*28  The book sleeps on the shelf next to the movies OK SILLY 
14  The tiger eats the deer in the jungle OK SILLY 
*25  The eraser sleeps on the carpet under the couch OK SILLY 
*21  The flower knows that there is a penny on the ground OK SILLY 
5  The girl eats chocolate chip cookies for desert OK SILLY 
16  The bear sleeps under a tree in the woods OK SILLY 
*17  The tulip wants the lady to go shopping OK SILLY 
2  The boy knows that the TV in his room was a gift OK SILLY 
6  The mother eats breakfast before she wakes up her children OK SILLY 
*27  The fridge sleeps in the kitchen next to the oven OK SILLY 
7  The child sleeps in the bed next to her sister OK SILLY 
3  The baby wants his mother to give him milk OK SILLY 
*32  The schoolbag eats chocolate cake for desert OK SILLY 
*22  The rose knows who painted the picture on the wall OK SILLY 





























We would like to thank you for your past interest and participation in our research 
program a few years ago and we wish to invite you to return to our laboratory for another 
study on cognitive development.  As you may recall, your child participated in one of our 
research projects when she or he was approximately 16-or 20-months-old.  In this study, 
we were interested in examining whether infants have acquired categories such as 
animals or people. To test whether infants have this ability, the experimenter modelled 
events which were either animal-like and people-like (motion events such as moving up a 
set of stairs) or exclusively people-like (sensory events such as answering a telephone).  
The experimenter modelled these motion events and sensory events using a monkey doll.  
After the modelling, infants were provided with the opportunity to imitate these events 
with a choice of two new toys: a new animal and a new person. 
 
We found that at 16 months of age infants consider people and animals as members of the 
same domain, and thus, have developed a broad category of animates by that age. The 
follow-up study with 20-month-olds indicated that by that age, infants begin to attribute 
sensory properties exclusively to people as opposed to animals. We are pleased to inform 
you that the results of this study will be published this year in the Journal of Cognition 
and Development.   
We are now eager to learn whether there is a link between infants’ imitative abilities and 
their later understanding of people’s behavior around the age of 6 years.  As such, we 
invite you to return to our laboratory with your child. Your child will be presented with a 
series of stories and asked to guess what a story character knows or prefers on the basis 
of these stories. We will also be investigating whether children’s vocabulary is related to 
their behavior during these tasks.  To measure vocabulary, children will be asked to point 
to pictures that correspond to different words.    
 
Participation would involve one visit of approximately one hour to our research centre on 
the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West. 
Appointments can be scheduled at a time convenient to you, including weekends. Free 
parking is available on the campus for our participants, and we will gladly reimburse any 
transportation expenses at the time of your appointment. In addition, a report of these 
results will be mailed to you as soon as the study is completed. 
 
We would greatly appreciate your continued cooperation and interest in our research 
project. Research on children’s early cognitive development is only possible thanks to the 
contribution of time and effort by families like you!  If you would like further 
information about this study, have any questions about issues concerning cognitive 
development, or are willing to participate, please do not hesitate to contact Sarah 











______________________                  ______________________                
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.                   Sarah Frenkiel-Fishman, M.A.                            
Professor                                                 Ph.D. Candidate                                 





















Psyc-Biol Task (ENGLISH) 
RANDOM ORDER #1 
 
 
Participant #:    Test Date: 
 




Age in  
Decimals 












8.a Does a stone have eyes? YES NO 
8.b Does a stone have bones? YES NO 
8.c Does a stone breathe? YES NO 
8.d Does a stone grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
8.e Can a stone feel pain if we prick it with a needle? YES NO 
8.f Can a stone move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
8.g Can a stone think? YES NO 
8.h Can a stone want something? YES NO 
8.i Can a stone know something? YES NO 
8.j Can a stone feel happy? YES NO 
8.k Can a stone speak to a person? YES NO 
8.l Does a stone have a heart? YES NO 
5.a Does a grasshopper have eyes? YES NO 
5.b Does a grasshopper have bones? YES NO 
5.c Does a grasshopper breathe? YES NO 
5.d Does a grasshopper grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
5.e Can a grasshopper feel pain if we prick it with a needle? YES NO 
5.f Can a grasshopper move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
5.g Can a grasshopper think? YES NO 
5.h Can a grasshopper want something? YES NO 
5.i Can a grasshopper know something? YES NO 
5.j Can a grasshopper feel happy? YES NO 
5.k Can a grasshopper speak to a person? YES NO 
5.l Does a grasshopper have a heart? YES NO 
2.a Does a rabbit have eyes? YES NO 
2.b Does a rabbit have bones? YES NO 
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2.c Does a rabbit breathe? YES NO 
2.d Does a rabbit grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
2.e Can a rabbit feel pain if we prick it with a needle? YES NO 
2.f Can a rabbit move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
2.g Can a rabbit think? YES NO 
2.h Can a rabbit want something? YES NO 
2.i Can a rabbit know something? YES NO 
2.j Can a rabbit feel happy? YES NO 
2.k Can a rabbit speak to a person? YES NO 
2.l Does a rabbit have a heart? YES NO 
3.a Does a pigeon have eyes? YES NO 
3.b Does a pigeon have bones? YES NO 
3.c Does a pigeon breathe? YES NO 
3.d Does a pigeon grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
3.e Can a pigeon feel pain if we prick it with a needle?  YES NO 
3.f Can a pigeon move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
3.g Can a pigeon think? YES NO 
3.h Can a pigeon want something? YES NO 
3.i Can a pigeon know something? YES NO 
3.j Can a pigeon feel happy? YES NO 
3.k Can a pigeon speak to a person? YES NO 
3.l Does a pigeon have a heart? YES NO 
6.a Does a tulip have eyes? YES NO 
6.b Does a tulip have bones? YES NO 
6.c Does a tulip breathe? YES NO 
6.d Does a tulip grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
6.e Can a tulip feel pain if we prick it with a needle? YES NO 
6.f Can a tulip move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
6.g Can a tulip think? YES NO 
6.h Can a tulip want something? YES NO 
6.i Can a tulip know something? YES NO 
6.j Can a tulip feel happy? YES NO 
6.k Can a tulip speak to a person? YES NO 
6.l Does a tulip have a heart? YES NO 
4.a Does a fish have eyes? YES NO 
4.b Does a fish have bones? YES NO 
4.c Does a fish breathe? YES NO 
4.d Does a fish grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
4.e Can a fish feel pain if we prick it with a needle? YES NO 
4.f Can a fish move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
4.g Can a fish think? YES NO 
4.h Can a fish want something? YES NO 
4.i Can a fish know something? YES NO 
4.j Can a fish feel happy? YES NO 
4.k Can a fish speak to a person? YES NO 
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4.l Does a fish have a heart? YES NO 
1.a Does a person have eyes? YES NO 
1.b Does a person have bones? YES NO 
1.c Does a person breathe? YES NO 
1.d Does a person grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
1.e Can a person feel pain if we prick him/her with a needle? YES NO 
1.f Can a person move by him/herself? YES NO 
1.g Can a person think? YES NO 
1.h Can a person want something? YES NO 
1.i Can a person know something? YES NO 
1.j Can a person feel happy? YES NO 
1.k Can a person speak to another person? YES NO 
1.l Does a person have a heart? YES NO 
7.a Does a tree have eyes? YES NO 
7.b Does a tree have bones? YES NO 
7.c Does a tree breathe? YES NO 
7.d Does a tree grow bigger and bigger? YES NO 
7.e Can a tree feel pain if we prick it with a needle? YES NO 
7.f Can a tree move to where it wants to by itself? YES NO 
7.g Can a tree think? YES NO 
7.h Can a tree want something? YES NO 
7.i Can a tree know something? YES NO 
7.j Can a tree feel happy? YES NO 
7.k Can a tree speak to a person? YES NO 


























The Child Development Laboratory at Concordia University is involved in a 
series of studies looking at infants’ understanding of animacy. This research is funded by 
the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. The Commission 
d'Accès à l'Information du Québec has kindly given us permission to consult birthlists 
provided by the Régie Régionale de la Santé et des Services Sociaux de la Région de 
Montréal-Centre. Your name appears on the birthlist of _______, which indicates that 
you have a child of an age appropriate for our study. 
 In the present study, we are examining infants’ understanding of living beings and 
inanimate objects. Your child will be presented with a selection of toys to play with for 
two minutes to assess his or her categorization skills. During this task, your child will be 
sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. A video camera will be used 
to record the tasks, so that we can measure how long your child plays with the toys.  
 Participation involves one visit to our research centre on the Loyola Campus of 
Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West. Appointments can be 
scheduled at a time which is convenient for you and your child, including weekends.  
Free parking is available on the campus for our participants, and we will gladly reimburse 
any other transportation expenses at the time of your visit. Upon completion of the study, 
a Certificate of Merit will be given to your child, and a report of the results of the study 
will be mailed to you as soon as it is completed 
 For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are ___ months of 
age, who hear English or French spoken at home, and who do not have any visual or 
hearing difficulties. If you are interested in having your child participate in this study, or 
would like any further information, please contact Kristin Rostad at 514-848-2424, ext. 
2279 or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois at 514-848-2424, ext. 2219. We will try to contact you 
by telephone within a few days of your receipt of this letter. 
 




___________________          ___________________   
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.    Kristin Rostad, B.A.   
Professor            M.A. Student   
Psychology Department    Psychology Department   
























Sample Parent Consent Form for Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) 
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Informed Consent Form 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being 
conducted by Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois and Kristin Rostad of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine how infants 
understand living beings and inanimate objects. 
 
B. PROCEDURES 
The present investigation involves examining how infants categorize objects in the 
world around them, and the strategies they are most likely to use. Your child will be 
presented with a series of small toys from different categories of objects and we will 
measure how long he/she touches each of them. During this task, your child will be 
sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape your 
child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. That 
means that the researcher will not reveal your child’s identity in any written or oral 
reports about this study. Your child will be assigned a coded number, and that number 
will be used on all data collected in this study.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you 
for his/her participation.  
 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the 
confidentiality of your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this 
investigation that inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of 
Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover information that indicates the 
possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent harm, they 
are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for 
this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to be taken.  
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at any time without negative consequences, and that the experimenter 
will gladly answer any questions that might arise during the course of the 
research. 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e., the researchers 
will know, but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual 








I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE 
MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are 
free to contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia 





_______________________   _______________________  
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.      Kristin Rostad, B.A.  
Professor    M.A. Student  
Department of Psychology  Department of Psychology  
514-848-2424 ext. 2219              514-848-2424 ext. 2279 


























SEQUENTIAL TOUCHING TASK – ADMINISTRATION PROTOCAL 
FOR AUTISTIC SAMPLE 
 
EXPLAINING THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY TO THE PARENTS 
  We will be presenting your child with some toys to play with 
  We would like to see what they do with these toys. 
 
TESTING SET-UP 
 Child is seated in a chair (or on parent’s lap). 
 If child is seated in a chair, the parent is seated behind the child. 
 The experimenter is seated in a chair across the table from the child, so that the experimenter is 
facing     the child. 
 All testing session are video-taped. 
 
PARENT INSTRUCTION 
During the study your child will definitely turn around to look at you, What I will ask you to do…  
 to remain neutral 
 OK to smile  
 OK to touch your child  
 OK turn him/her back around 
 Do NOT touch any particular item 
 Do NOT label any of the items   
 Do NOT talk to your child 
 OK to pick up or catch a toy if it falls on the floor 
 Important not to influence child in any way, children are very good at picking up cues 
 
ADMINISTRATION OF SEQUENTIAL TOUCHING TASK: 
 Present all 8 toys on a tray in a random fashion  
 Allow child to play with toys for about 2 minutes – or until s/he touches all the toys 
 Place tray in the middle of the child & make sure it is within reach  
 Say “Look at these…. These are for you to play with.” 
 
  If child turns around to look at the parent: redirect the child’s attention by saying:  
          “CHILD’S NAME   Look at the toys!” 
 
  If child ignores some of the toys (i.e. does not touch the toys), highlight the toys (wave hand in 
circle  above the toys- without pointing at any specific toy) and say: 
          “CHILD’S NAME   Look at these!” 
 
  Experimenter does not say anything else 
 
  If the child drops an object or an object is out of reach 
            Unobtrusively place object within reach 
 
DEBRIEFING AFTER THE STUDY 
 Children presented with a series of toys such as these are likely to touch the objects in a 
systematic manner. Often children touch the items from a given category in sequence.  
 This phenomenon has been observed in many children, across different studies, so it doesn’t 
seem to be just random.  
 The way they touch the items seems to be giving us information about what they have noticed. 
Children are noticing that these 2 items are related, or part of the same “category.”  
 This gives us important information about how children understand objects in the world around 
them. At this age, children seem to have developed a sophisticated understanding of the world 
around them. However, they do not yet have the words to be able to tell us what it is that they 





















































CODING PROTOCOL FOR SEQUENTIAL TOUCHING TASK  
  
The following rules should record the sequence of the toys touched. 
 Begin coding (and time counting) once the child touches a toy and all the toys are present 
on the table. 




Animal A A  A A    
Vehicle   V   V V V 
 
This means two animals were touched, then a vehicle, than two animals again, then three 
vehicles (or two vehicles since the first and last vehicle can be the same toy: This is explained 
later) 
 Each trial last 2 ½ minutes (Use the timer on the VCR to record this time because trials can 
go over). 
 At the end of the trial record the total number of touches, and the mean run length (MRL)- 
combining both animal and vehicle categories 
 
e.g.:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Touches MRL 
A A  A A    A  A A A A 
14 2.00 
  V   V V V  V     
 
 MRL is the mean number of objects belonging to the same category which a child touches 
in one sequence.  To determine the MRL: calculate how many times the object (from the 
same category) is touched in a row for each instance, e.g.: the child touched the animal 2 
times, 2 times, once, 4 times.  The child also touched the vehicle once, then 3 times, then 
once. Then, divide the number of instances the sequential touching took place across the 
entire task (e.g.: 7 times) Therefore,  






There are more specific rules to deal with other events that may occur during the session. 
  
 If an interval of more than 10 seconds occurs between two touches, a break in sequence 
should be recorded. This is designated by a double line in the grid. Ultimately, this will affect 
the mean run length since the sequence of touching is interrupted by a delay. E.g.: Using 
the same example as above, lets say there is a 30 second delay between two of the 
touches with the animal: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Touches MRL 
A A  A A    A  A A A A 
14 1.75 
  V   V V V  V     
 
 If the experimenter or the parent draws the child’s attention to a certain toy or a toy falls, 
and the child touches it immediately, this should not be counted as part of the sequence. 
Record this touch with an X.  
A   A A    1A, 1V, 2A, 3V  
 V    V V V  
 
 
 If the child touches the same toy twice or more in succession (without a 10 second break) it 
is counted as the same touch. 
(Do not record it twice. However, if a child touches a toy, 10s elapse, and s/he touches the toy 
again,  this is counted as a new touch. 
 If the child focuses on and touches a new toy, while still holding another object, record a 
touch for the new object  
 If the child holds an object in his hand, and plays with other objects with the other hand, and 
then returns attention to the original object. This is counted as a single touch – the first time 
the child touches it, even though the child has returned attention to it later. 
 An object can be coded more than once, if a child: touches the object, then lets it go, 
then touches a different object, then touches the original object again. 
 If two objects are touched at the same time, record them both and put a circle around them. 
o If two objects are from the same category, this is counted as one touch. 
o If two objects from different categories are touched, this is not counted at all (record 
them with a circle around it) 
 Touch: Physical contact with an object using finger, hand, or other object. 
o The touch must be deemed as intentional and the infant has to be focused on 
the object (Oakes et al., 1996).  
o Accidental touches (brushing against a toy while reaching for another) or  
touching an object without looking at it, does not qualify as a “touch”  






































SEQUENTIAL TOUCHING TASK – AUTISM STUDY 
 
Name: _________________________ Subject Number: _________    Sex: F    
M     Tested by: _______________ 
 
Date Tested: __________________Date of Birth: _______________   Coder: 
____________________ 
 
Lap Baby: Y   N Parental Interference:  
_________________________________________________________ 
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